Page 463 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo I

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army was able to exploit what the British analyst and historian B.H. Lidell Hart called
“the largest flank ever known in modern warfare”. In practice, the Soviet army executed
a strategic march through the territory controlled by Romanian troops, closing in to the
borders of Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. It resumed the fighting with the German troops at
a distance of 650-750 km west to the point they were located on August 23, 1944. The
chief of staff of the Ukrainian 2 Front, General M.V. Zakharov, wrote that the large
nd
units under his command were advancing over 50 kilometers a day (armored vehicles)
and 30-35 kilometers (infantry), a pace significantly higher than average. Consequently,
on September 3, the Soviet army entered Bulgarian territory and, on September 6, the
Yugoslav territory, something that led to important political and military mutations in
both countries. By late September, the large Soviet units reached Greece, which will
later be embroiled in a civil war.
One of the most important consequences was the creation of a bridgehead in the
north and west of Carpathians, covering an area of about 50 000 square kilometers.
Consequently, the German command was prevented from creating a defensive line on
this mountain range, something that allowed Romanian and Soviet forces to concentrate
in the region in order to resume the offensive in the direction of middle Danube, towards
Budapest, Vienna and Bratislava. Understanding the importance of this mountain
barrier , the German command organized in the first half of September 1944 two
20
counterstrikes in order to take hold of the Carpathian arch, but they were repelled by the
large Romanian units, with Soviet support towards the end.
Equally important was the fact that, because of the success of the combined operation,
Germany was deprived of Romanian oil, which was essential for carrying on the fighting.
The shortage of oil worsened after the failure of the Wehrmacht in the campaign of 1942,
which made Romania’s oil reserves of outmost importance. While there were a number
of oil fields in Galicia, Austria and Hungary, the extracted quantities were significantly
smaller . For instance, in 1943 alone, Romania exported to Germany 1 776 800 tons of
21
oil products and, until August 23, 1944, some further 763 800 tons, in addition to the 35
900 tons to the protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia .
22
During the Romanian-German confrontations of August 23-31, 1944, the German
command stressed that Ploieşti area must remain under German control “at any cost” .
23
It must also be said that regaining the control over Romanian oil deeply preoccupied
Hitler. The final goal of the last German offensive during the Second World War, which
was launched at Balaton on March 6, 1945, were the oil fields from Ploieşti, whose

20 General Johannes Friessner, the commander of the Army Group South Ukraine, stressed in his memoirs that
the goal of the offensive was “to conquer the passes from Southern Carpathians and to block them… as
mountains were our best allies. The enemy could have been stopped here with special forces, relatively few
in number, much easier that in the area situated in the north of these passes”. (Cf. Hans Friessner, Verratene
Schlachten.Die Tragődie der deutschen Wehrmacht in Rumanien un Ungarn, Holstei Verlag, Hamburg, 1956,
p. 47)
21 In 1942, the quantities extracted from Galicia stood at 340 000 tons and from Hungary at 150 000 tons.
22 Andreas Hillgruber, Hitler, Regele Carol şi Mareşalul Antonescu. Relaţiile germano-române 1938-1944, ed.
Stelian Neagoe, Humanitas, Bucureşti, 1993, p. 290-291.
23 Hans Kissel, Die Katastrophe in Roumanien, Darmstadt, 1964, p. 144.