Page 460 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo I

460 XXXIX Congresso della CommIssIone InternazIonale dI storIa mIlItare • CIHm

led to a different course of events.
The events from Bucharest constituted a surprise for Hitler and his entourage, who
were convinced that Marshal Ion Antonescu controlled the situation. They maintained
this conviction until the very last moment, although the political and military preparations
were widely discussed in the Bucharest parlors.
It was a serious error of judgment and the subsequent reaction precipitated the
Romanian-German conflict. On August 23, 1944, Hitler had to face a serious dilemma. If
he had tried to make Romania a second Italy, then this new front would have swallowed
some of the German divisions that were indispensable to the war effort. They risked
being destroyed by the Soviets and Tito’s armies. If he had allowed the events to take
their course, he would have lost the oil, facilitate Bulgaria’s exit from the alliance and
potentially face some unpleasant surprises from Hungary.
Listening to the erroneous assessment by A. Gerstenberg, according to which “the
coup” was the product of a small clique of politicians and officers, in agreement with
the king, but without the support of the population, Hitler ordered the suppression of the
Bucharest “putsch”, the reinstatement of Antonescu or, in case this was not possible, the
appointment of a new government led by a philo-German general.
This is how the chance offered by the new Romanian authorities in the evening of
August 23, meant to avoid a conflict between the two former allies, was squandered.
Therefore, the initiative of attacking the former comrades belonged to the German army,
whose air forces attacked Bucharest. The state of belligerence subsequently extended in
many areas where the Germans had a significant presence.
The confrontations between Romanian and German troops lasted until the end of
August 1944, the Romanian army emerging victorious. The clashes had some unique
traits, as there was no continuous front, in a classical sense, the German troops being
deployed to various points, especially around economic, political and strategic objectives.
Therefore, the German “pockets” and convoys were isolated, divided and liquidated, by
fighting or by their surrender.
The extreme fluidity of the events required from the Romanian commanders and
troops great mobility, rapid decisions, the creation of ad-hoc fighting structures, the use
of tactics and procedures that were not previously employed (ambushes, pursuits, etc.).
In the reports submitted after the end of the operation, many Romanian commanders
recognized the atypical character of the confrontations they took part in. Thus, the
commander of the Artillery Training Center stated in his report from September 7, 1944,
that it was the first time when “the pupils of the School of Artillery and recruits from
the garrison were engaged in guerrilla warfare, in subunits that were created ad-hoc and
with improvised means of transportation” .
16
Recent investigations show that there were cases when the Romanian-German
camaraderie continued even after the emergence of the state of war between the two
countries, some Romanian commanders refusing confrontation and allowing German
convoys, units and subunits to leave the national territory. Such cases took place in
the Buzău Valley, in Banat, on the Black Sea, where the German fleet left the port of

16 DIMR, Vol. IV (23/31 august 1944),… p. 345.