Page 459 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo I
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ActA
the German troops; d) to prepare the offensive to recapture Northern Transylvania. The
first three missions required immediate actions, while for the fourth new orders were
to be expected. The two Romanian armies from the front, the 3 and the 4 , were to
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regroup initially in the area Focşani-Galaţi and later on in the area Ploieşti-Bucureşti in
order to facilitate the offensive to the north of Carpathians. The troops inside the country
received clear missions in accordance to their area of deployment. Therefore, the 1
st
Army, deployed in the north of Carpathians in the west of the country, was tasked to
secure Romania’s western border and the Romanian-Hungarian demarcation line in the
Transylvanian plateau and to eliminate German presence from its area of responsibility.
In Oltenia, the 1 Army Corps received the same missions, while Muntenia was
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divided into two areas: the northern part became the area of responsibility of the
Territorial 5 Corps, while the southern part of the Territorial 2 Corps. Their missions
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were to eliminate German troops and to deter the arrival of German and Bulgarian
reinforcements from the other side of the Danube. Bucharest and its surroundings were
the area of responsibility of the Military Command of the Capital, which received
reinforcements from the Territorial 2 Corps, while Dobruja – the area between Danube
nd
and the Black Sea – was the area of responsibility of the 2 Army Corps.
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The directive also provisioned specific missions for the air forces and air defense and
also for the naval forces. The latter received the mission to deter German and Bulgarian
infiltrations in Danube’s delta and to safeguard maritime Danube: at their turn, the river
flotillas safeguarded the Danube between Brăila şi Silistra, especially the passes from
Brăila, Hîrşova, Cernavodă and Călăraşi.
Besides the specific missions they were entrusted, the Romanian troops were tasked
to maintain the order, to stop any act of sabotage against railroads, communication lines,
oil refineries, factories, etc.; to break German communications of any kind in order to
paralyze the chain of command. The directive stipulated that “the military action must
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be swift, in order to take advantage of the initial surprise” .
On August 30, 1944, the Romanian General Staff issued the third operative directive
(no. 51), at a time when the combined operation was practically completed . It was
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addressed to the 1 and 4 Army, which received new orders in order to cover the line of
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demarcation in the north of Southern Carpathians and the western border and to prepare
the offensive in order to liberate the territory that was ceded through the Vienna Diktat.
These operative directives were constantly supplemented by a series of orders and
provisions, which added explanatory notes and nuances, in accordance with the events
on the ground, but without significantly altering the strategic framework established by
the document issued in the evening of August 23.
The unfolding of the combined operation
One of the most urgent missions was to settle the rapports with the former ally,
namely the German army. As previously mentioned, the Romanian authorities wanted
the German troops to withdraw without confrontation, but the decisions taken in Berlin
14 Ibidem, p. 16.
15 Ibidem, vol.IV. p.72-74.

