Page 534 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo I

534 XXXIX Congresso della CommIssIone InternazIonale dI storIa mIlItare • CIHm

Netherlands Navy. References to the Netherlands’ prestigious maritime past, its efforts
in Allied context during World War II and the dependency on Sea Lines of Communi-
cation, formed the basis for this opinion. The government, which for financial reasons
initially was less enthusiast in building a relatively large fleet, gave in to parliament.
Hereafter it defended the budget for a sizable navy emphasising obligations arising from
the UN Charter, and the protection of Dutch overseas interests in crisis circumstances.
The Minister of the Navy ad interim, W.F. Schokking, referred in this context to ear-
lier, pre-war actions by Dutch warships in crisis areas like Shanghai, China, during the
1920s and 1930s, with the navy promoting national interests in ad hoc international
naval squadrons.
Incidentally, with this policy the Dutch politicians were acting contrary to the wishes
of the NATO leadership, which initially saw little point in a large Royal Netherlands
Navy. This was at a time when the British and U.S. navies appeared to be sufficient for
securing the oceans.
The Dutch Admiralty naturally concurred with this national political position, hav-
ing long propagated the importance of an ocean-going fleet. Naval historian G. Teitler
demonstrates that former and serving flag officers mounted a maritime-military counter-
offensive, both in terms of publicity and politics, against the lobby from the side of both
the Dutch army and air force for more budget at the expense of the navy. The influential
C.E.L. Helfrich, Admiral (ret.), highlighted in several magazines and newspapers the
value of national oceangoing flotillas. The deputy Chief of the Naval Staff captain H.A.,
squire van Foreest, declared in a policy document to the Minister of the Navy that a
“strong Dutch fleet […] for the national interests as well as those of the United Nations,
would be of far greater importance than an army or air force”.
Moreover, in addition to being familiar with pre-war ad hoc multinational naval
task forces, from 1940 onward the Royal Netherlands Navy also gained experience in
worldwide combined operations, through integrated manoeuvres in flotillas of the Brit-
ish Royal Navy. After the Second World War, the two navies continued to cooperate
extensively, both in terms of materiel (the majority of the Dutch men-of-war and planes
of the naval air service in 1950 was of British origin or design) and in the areas of doc-
trine and training.

War in Korea
Communist North Korea, materially and politically supported by both Moscow and
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Beijing, invaded on 25 June 1950 South Korea, that was backed by Washington. The
White House did not want to suffer another defeat in Asia, after Mao Zedong’s victory
in China in 1949. It seized the opportunity provided by the Korean conflict to take robust
action against further expansion of Communist power anywhere in the world. Moreover,
the conflict would give the United States an indication of the willingness of its Western
European Allies to conform to U.S. foreign, and security policies.
Without the Soviet Union present, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution
shortly after the invasion, identifying Pyongyang as the aggressor and calling for a
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ceasefire and a withdrawal of troops to the 38 parallel. On 27 June, the United Na-