Page 536 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo I

536 XXXIX Congresso della CommIssIone InternazIonale dI storIa mIlItare • CIHm

They were under the command of the U.S. Commander, Naval Forces, Far East (COM-
NAVFE), who was also Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Japan (COMNAVJAP), Vice
Admiral C.T. Joy, USN. He reported to the American General D. MacArthur, Com-
mander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command.
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On 6 July, Admiral Joy brought the ships pledged by the British Commonwealth, as
well as the other Western naval vessels that were expected, together in a West Korean
Support Group, under the British Rear Admiral W.G. Andrewes. The ships were organ-
ised in an American-style Task Force, TF 96, and subordinate Task Groups, in this case
TG 96.8. An East Korean Support Group, which was to be formed with only American
ships under the command of Rear Admiral J.M. Higgins, USN, was designated TG 96.5.
The U.S. Seventh Fleet operated independently for the time being, on account of its
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separate command and responsibilities in other Asian waters. On 27 July 1950, both
Support Groups merged into one Task Group, TG 96.5.
In September 1950, however, the Commonwealth naval forces and all other non-
American Allied ships were again brought into a separate Task Group, TG 95.1, under
Task Force 95. This Task Force was part of the U.S. Seventh Fleet from April 1951 until
the ceasefire in July 1953.
The British Commonwealth-flotilla, in which the Dutch men-of-war were divided,
had the Japanese port of Sasebo as its main base. Regarding the supply, these vessels
(including the Dutch with their former ships of the Royal Navy) would draw their am-
munition and spare parts from British stocks in Hong Kong. Food etc. would be pro-
vided by the Americans.
The British Commonwealth-flotilla/international force was sent to the waters off the
Korean west coast and given the following orders: a) enforce a blockade of coastal areas
occupied by the North Koreans; b) prevent infiltrations in coastal areas occupied by South
Korea; c) if necessary, provide fire support against North Korean sea and land targets.
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On 19 July, Hr.Ms. Evertsen arrived in the area of operations, joining Rear Ad-
miral Andrewes’ Task Group in Sasebo, Japan. The British flag officer stated that the
“business-like appearance” of the Evertsen during her first patrols made on him “a very
favourable impression”.
New to the Dutch, but to most of the other UN naval forces as well, was that vari-
ous coastal bombardments were carried out in cooperation with helicopters, which con-
ducted impact observation and reconnaissance for the ships, reporting to them by radio.
Keeping the international force supplied with enough ammunition was a constant chal-
lenge. Due to the resulting replenishment at sea, which was unusual for the Dutch, they
did, however, gradually become used to operating together with all their Anglo-Saxon
Allies. This included the so-called ‘Corpen Crazy Club’ method; international flag sig-
nals and radio orders in divers variations of Anglo-Saxon ‘slang’, which led to instant
changes in the course and speed of carrier and cruiser escort groups.
In view of earlier enemy territorial gains on the west coast after China’s direct in-
volvement in the conflict, Task Group commander Andrewes initiated the occupation of
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islands north of the 38 parallel. They were to serve as bases for coastal blockades and
the disruption of enemy mine-laying operations.