Page 548 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo I

548 XXXIX Congresso della CommIssIone InternazIonale dI storIa mIlItare • CIHm

Rather than cooperate with the political officers, MAAG sought to limit the role of
political officers and gradually isolate them within the military organization. American
officers resisted assigning an advisor to the Political Department and eventually
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assigned a token one officer from the several hundred on Taiwan to serve as a liaison.
MAAG also devoted no resources to assist the Political Department, in spite of the
large amount of American funding available. Within military units, American MAAG
officers encouraged regular Chinese military officers to fill most of the functions that
political officers were assigned to, such as promoting morale through sporting activities,
presenting lectures, or helping soldiers with personal concerns such as moving their
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families after re-assignments.
The close partnership between the U.S. MAAG program and the ROC military became
increasingly constrained by political developments during 1954. In late 1954, MAAG
lost its main partner within the ROC Army because General Sun Lijen was removed
from his command position and given the empty title of military advisor to Chiang Kai-
shek. During his period of leadership from 1950-1954, Sun had supported MAAG in
opposing the political officers inclusion in the ROC military. By 1954, Chiang’s Political
Department had also strengthened its position within the ROC military by installing
over 10,000 political officers in all units of the ROC military. 16
As a result of continued intransigence by senior Chinese leaders, especially Chiang
Kai-shek and his son Chiang Ching-kuo, the loss of MAAG’s main Chinese ally, Sun
Lijen, and MAAG desperation, American military policy changed from isolation of
political officers to an attempt to moderate their influence through education. In the
words of General Chase, “We could not whip it, so we joined it.” This represented a
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clear defeat for MAAG and highlighted decreasing political influence.
Further diminishment of the MAAG influence continued in 1955 with the signing
of the Sino-American mutual defense treaty. The treaty stipulated that the United States
had a formal obligation to defend Taiwan from attack. This treaty removed much of
the urgency from ROC military reform efforts because it could now rely on American
military power, including nuclear weapons, to defend its territory. With increased
military security, Chiang Ching-kuo was able to move against the ROC’s most effective
military officer, Sun Lijen, who was consigned to house arrest for thirty-three years.
Lastly, in June 1955 General Chase retired from U.S. Army active duty. After the
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14 FRUS, 1951, Volume VII. The Charge in the Republic of China (Rankin) to the Department of State.
December 11, 1951. Pp. 1866.
15 FRUS, 1951, Volume VII. Memorandum by the Chief of the Navy Section of the Military Assistance
Advisory Group, Formosa (Beyerly) to the Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group, Formosa
(Chase). November 9, 1951. Pp. 1868
16 U.S. State Department Confidential Files, Formosa-Republic of China, 1950-1954. Frederick: University
Publications of America, 1986.; Memorandum for Record: From Advisor to General Political Department,
NGRC to K. Rankin (Ambassador) Subject: MAAG Personnel for General Political Department. Aug 1,
1953. Confidential. Reel 4, p. 6.
17 William Chase, Front Line General: The Commands of William C. Chase, (Houston: Pacesetter Press, 1975),
p. 181.
18 Chicago Tribune, “Report: Gen. Chase Will Retire as Head of MAAG,” Jun 19, 1955, p. 9.