Page 546 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo I
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546 XXXIX Congresso della CommIssIone InternazIonale dI storIa mIlItare • CIHm
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and transportation where the ROC military was deficient in supporting itself.
Throughout the early years of MAAG on Taiwan, Americans benefitted from the
support of a group of ROC officers who shared their aspirations for the ROC Army.
Sun Lijen’s excellent English skills and reputation as a competent commander in the
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Burma campaign under Stilwell endeared him to American MAAG officers. Sun had no
strong political ties to the KMT Party or many of the older Generals and Sun, together
with many younger and professional officers, stood to gain in power and influence from
American plans to increase the combat effectiveness of the ROC Army.
Reform through Education
Early in the MAAG program, it was decided that a large portion of the American
assistance effort would be devoted towards developing a comprehensive, American-
type military school system. General Chase fully supported a heavy emphasis on officer
education rather than soldier training, “the more professionally qualified their senior
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officers are, the more chance of success they have.” Drawing on General Chase’s
affinity for formal schooling and building from the framework of ROC military schools
developed in 1947-1949, a large percentage of American MAAG personnel were
assigned to military schools.
With MAAG assistance the number of schools was more than doubled, eventually
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including thirty-eight separate institutions offering nearly four hundred courses. The
crown jewels in this pedagogical network were the senior officer Colleges: the National
War College, Armed Forces Staff College and the Command and General Staff College,
all of which were established in 1952. Below these graduate level schools was a large
network of officer training programs, with branch schools for armor, infantry, air defense
etc., providing the main location for officer exposure to sophisticated equipment and
tactics. MAAG’s interest in ROC military schools even extended to assigning an U.S.
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Army Bandmaster to establish an ROC military band school. Supplementing these
schools was an extensive program of overseas study with thousands of ROC military
personnel, the majority of whom were officers attending civilian and military schools in
the United States. 8
MAAG officers assigned to ROC military schools tried to remain in the background
if possible and let qualified ROC personnel conduct direct training. American advisors
3 FRUS, 1951, Volume VII. The Under Secretary of State (Webb) to the Director of the Bureau of the Budget
(Lawton), April 17, 1951. Pp. 1634-1635
4 New York Times. Appraisal of Formosa: Chiang’s Island Has Big Potential Power But it Must be Developed
and Directed. Hanson Baldwin. April 2, 1951, p. 4.; William Chase, Front Line General: The Commands of
William C. Chase, (Houston: Pacesetter Press, 1975), p. 171.
5 Selected Executive Session Hearings of the Committee 1951-56. Mutual Security Program, Part 2. U.S.
House of Representatives, Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1980. Pp. 574.
6 Ministry of Nation Defense . MAAG’s Decade in the Republic of China. May 1, 1961. Taipei: Ministry of
National Defense, Pp. 18.; Headquarters, Military Assistance Advisory Group, Taiwan. Subject: Revision-
Country Statement on MAP, Non-NATO Countries, 10 August 1957, p. 8.
7 Stars and Stripes Pacific Edition. An Army Man of Note: Mr. Music Maker. April 7, 1956, p. 24.
8 William Chou, “MAAG—Saga of Service,” Taiwan Review. June 6, 1966. Pp. 2

