Page 547 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo I

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focused their efforts on “training the trainers” and to allow Chinese instructors to be
seen as independent, which was believed to be important for morale and in keeping with
concerns that MAAG personnel not be seen as a separate chain of command within the
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ROC military. The assignment of large numbers of MAAG officers to widely dispersed
military schools, many of which were in the southern part of the island, also had a
political purpose in removing American officers from political intrigues in Taipei and
avoiding a concentration of American personnel in the capital, which might give the
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appearance it was an “occupied” town.
MAAG Opposition to Political Officers
Dating back to American efforts to improve the performance of Chinese Army units
during WWII, there had been friction surrounding the role of “political officers” within
Chinese units. American officers felt that political officers were a form of political
interference by the KMT in military operations and a potentially dangerous division
of command authority. Chinese political leaders argued that American’s “did not
sufficiently understand” the need for ideological conformity and political surveillance
within the ROC Army. 11
After the collapse of the ROC armies in 1948 and 1949, many KMT Party members,
including Chiang Kai-shek, felt that the elimination of the political officers from the
ROC Army resulted in decreased cohesion, lowered morale and allowed Communist
subversion within military units. In one of the first meetings between General Chase
and Chiang Kai-shek, political officers emerged as an area of sharp disagreement. In
General Chase’s initial survey of ROC military units, conducted immediately after he
arrived on Taiwan, he noted that, “There is, throughout the Armed Forces, a highly
objectionable system of Political Commissars, that acts to penalize initiative and under-
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mine the authority of commanders of all echelons.” Chase’s use of the term “political
commissars,” rather than the Chiang and the U.S. State Department’s favored usage
of “political officers” is reflective of underlying negative associations of a Soviet style
system of political monitoring of the armed forces.
In addition to American military concerns about the erosion of a commanders
authority, American government officials were also skeptical of the political officer
system because it was perceived to be part of a broader secret police system responsible
not to the government of the ROC but the KMT party and Chiang family. 13

9 Charles Barber, “Military Assistance Advisory Group Formosa,” Military Review 34:9 (December 1954).
Pp.54.
10 U.S. State Department Confidential Files, Formosa-Republic of China, 1950-1954. (Frederick: University
Publications of America, 1986).; Telegram: From: Taipei (Rankin) To: Secretary of State June 15, 1951. Reel
5. Secret.
11 Goufangbu zong zhengzhi bu, Guojun zhenggong shigao, (Taipei: Guojun zhenggong shibian, 1960), p.
1499.
12 FRUS, 1951, Volume VII. The Charge in the Republic of China (Rankin) to the Department of State, July 6,
1951. Pp. 1730-1732
13 FRUS, 1951, Volume VII. Memorandum by the Officer in Charge of Chinese Economic Affairs (Barnett) to
the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk). October 3, 1951. Pp. 1816-1827. Pp. 1820.