Page 559 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo I

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that the emerging nuclear stalemate made a major war against the Soviet Union unlikely
and any war that did occur was likely to result in a nuclear exchange at an early stage. In
such circumstances there was little point in maintaining the conventional forces required
to fight a long war but there was both a need and an opportunity to deal with instability
4
overseas. The result was a growing interest in mobile and flexible forces able to deal with
unforeseen crises beyond Europe, particularly in the area ‘east of Suez’ where Britain
retained residual interests and responsibilities. This process received a significant boost
5
after the 1956 Suez crisis demonstrated the weakness of Britain’s existing expeditionary
capabilities. In the years after Suez there was a notable emphasis on the development of
such forces and also on increasing joint co-operation.
In the aftermath of the Second World War British imperial defence had basically
reverted to its pre-war form built around a global system of bases and garrisons held
together by sea and air communications. The system worked tolerably well insofar as
it enabled Britain to maintain access to and control of its overseas possessions at a
reasonable cost, but it did have major short comings and these were becoming more
apparent by the mid-1950s. 6
Bases were of limited utility without credible mobile forces able to operate from
them. During the Abadan crisis in 1951 the absence of any significant expeditionary
capability badly undermined British military planning. Five years later, during the Suez
7
crisis, the military were unable to provide useful options until months had passed, by
which time the options were not useful anymore. Operation Musketeer in November
1956 showed up the danger of relying too much on static bases that were either too
distant (Malta), under-developed (Cyprus) or unavailable for political reasons (Libya,
Jordan and Sri Lanka). The ponderous conduct of Musketeer further demonstrated
deficiencies in Britain’s expeditionary capabilities and made a material contribution to
the political collapse that occurred back in London. 8
The history of the Suez base provided ample testimony to the political difficulties
inherent in maintaining bases on non-sovereign territory. It was significant that Nasser
nationalised the Suez Canal only days after the last British troops vacated a base that
had become untenable in the face of opposition from the host nation. In the aftermath
of the crisis Britain was to lose access to important facilities in Jordan, Iraq and Sri
Lanka, further underlining the difficulty of relying on bases in foreign lands, while the

4 See UK National Archives (UKNA) DEFE 5/59. COS (55) 176, 25 July 1955.
5 ‘East of Suez’ was a term used to refer to the Asia-Pacific region in general, and particularly to the Indian
Ocean littoral, the Persian Gulf, South East Asia and Hong Kong, areas where Britain retained major defence
commitments.
6 For an overview of British policy see Phillip Darby, British Defence Policy East of Suez 1947-1968,
(1973). Also see Jeffrey Pickering, Britain’s Withdrawal from East of Suez. The Politics of Retrenchment,
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998) and Saki Dockrill, Britain’s Retreat from East of Suez. The Choice between
Europe and the World, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002)
7 See ‘A Splutter of Musketry. The British Military Response to the Anglo-Iranian Oil Dispute, 1951’ in
Contemporary British History, Vol. 17, Issue 1, Spring 2003, pp. 39-66.
8 For further reading on the Suez Crisis see Keith Kyle, Suez: Britain’s End of Empire in the Middle East,
(2002) and Roy Fullick and Geoffrey Powell, Suez. The Double War, (1979).