Page 562 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo I

562 XXXIX Congresso della CommIssIone InternazIonale dI storIa mIlItare • CIHm

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policy and promote training and experimentation. In 1959 the first unified (i.e. joint)
overseas command had been created at Aden (Middle East Command), followed in 1961
and 1963 by Near East Command (Cyprus) and Far East Command (Singapore). The
Ministry of Defence was also undergoing change, strengthening its central powers at the
expense of the individual Service Ministries under the reforms supported by Admiral
Mountbatten, the Chief of the Defence Staff. In stressing the joint credentials of the
JSSF the Royal Navy tapped into an issue of growing prominence in British thinking.
The Navy’s new concept does not appear to have worried the Army too much. The
main concern of the War Office, busy adjusting to the shift to voluntary recruitment, was
to protect historic regiments from the axe. Their periodic interest in the amphibious role
is best explained in this context and the expansion of Royal Marine Commandos to five
active units was viewed with jealousy and alarm. The Admiralty had to fend off Army
attempts to take over the role of one or more commandos and also to take command
of the Commando Brigade. Some within the ‘dark-blue’ element of the Naval Service
recognised that the marines could be sacrificed in order to buy Army support for the
JSSF but little came of this. The Royal Marines’ expertise in expeditionary warfare was
too obvious an asset to be given up lightly. 18
To say that the concept caused a heated reaction from the RAF would be an
understatement. The RAF’s concept of operations east of Suez was radically different.
The latter focused on balanced forces able to deal with moderate opposition, with a
reduced reliance on overseas bases. The RAF developed an alternative concept built
around strategic air transport and the delivery of long-range fires from a series of as
yet undeveloped bases in the region. Their approach required more bases overseas
than already existed. They saw little need for sophisticated amphibious forces and no
need for large aircraft carriers. Focusing on a much lower level of potential opposition
than did the Navy, intervention without ‘red carpet’ reception facilities was reliant on
airborne forces operating up to 1,000 miles from the mounting base. In operations at
such ranges, and in the absence of aircraft carriers, dismissed as expensive, vulnerable
and unnecessary, air superiority would be achieved by pre-emptive air strikes and fighter
aircraft could be flown forward once (if) an airfield was secured. 19
Opposition to the Navy’s plans to construct new aircraft carriers lay at the heart of
this scheme and this reflected a longstanding, almost reflexive opposition to such vessels.
The RAF were willing to countenance small ships, somewhat akin to the later Invincible
class but they virulently opposed anything that might challenge their role as the main
providers of strike aircraft overseas. The loss of the nuclear bomber role to the Navy’s
submarines did not encourage them to compromise on this issue. The RAF showed no

17 COS (62) 12, Seaborne/Airborne/Land Operations, 4 Jan 1962 and COS (62) 84, Joint Warfare Sun-Committees
and Joint Warfare staff, 28 Feb 1962, UKNA DEFE 5/123. COS 365/63, Joint Warfare Committee – Terms
of Reference, 8 Nov. 1963, UKNA DEFE 5/144. COS (62) 426, Joint Warfare training and development, 31
Oct 1962, UKNA DEFE 5/131. COS (62) 68 mtg, 20 Oct 1962, UKNA DEFE 4/148..
18 For example see UKNA DEFE 7/1681, ADM 202/185, ADM 205/191 and ADM 201/135.
19 UKNA AIR 8/2354 and AIR 20/11423.