Page 561 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo I

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capable force in readiness without offending local sensibilities. 11
The simple fact of the matter was that few people welcomed foreign troops on their
soil even when such troops were there to help. They were also unlikely to want to
become drawn into a crisis by offering transit rights. The problem for Britain was to find
a means of projecting power and influence overseas with a reduced emphasis on bases
in and over-flight of other countries. In response to this the Royal Navy and the Royal
Air Force (RAF) were to develop rather different solutions.
The Royal Navy developed a concept for mobile and flexible maritime task forces
capable of landing a full brigade group and all of the logistic support to sustain it in combat
against modern opposition. Described by the Navy as the Joint Services Seaborne Force
(JSSF), the concept was designed to cater for operations against ‘moderate opposition’,
but did not envisage assault landings against heavily defended beaches. It was designed
to reduce dependence on overseas bases, anticipating a time when Britain might have
access to only one major base east of Suez, probably in Australia. In this respect it
12
reflected government policy. The 1962 Defence White Paper emphasised the need to
insure against the future loss of bases by increasing the strategic mobility of British
13
forces.
The concept was overtly joint. While the Royal Marines were to supply the amphibious
spearhead of the JSSF the Army would provide support and follow-on forces. The Navy’s
new amphibious ships (HMS Fearless and HMS Intrepid) were designed specifically
so that they could embark the full range of Army equipment. Aircraft carriers would
provide mobile air defence and close air support for the embarked force while land
based RAF aircraft would offer additional support and long range strike capabilities
when within range and RAF transport aircraft would bring reinforcements into theatre
14
once secure reception facilities were available.
In order to create synergies between air and maritime forces in the expeditionary
role a new concept of operations was required. The result was the seaborne/airborne/
land concept developed, after tri-service consultation, in 1959/60. The concept was
15
16
eventually incorporated into the first Manual of Joint Warfare in 1965. This was
matched by institutional developments, notably with the establishment of a Joint
Warfare Committee, Joint Warfare Staff and Joint Warfare Establishment to develop

11 Captain Steiner, Report to Flag Officer Middle East, UKNA ADM 1/29063. 45 Commando Royal Marines,
Preliminary Report on Operations in Tanganyika, Feb. 1964, UKNA ADM 29063. Report on the Activities
of 41 Commando Royal Marines, 1 Jan. 1964 – 10 April 1964, UKNA ADM 202/510. Lt-Col Stephens, ‘A
Joint Operation in Tanganyika’, RUSI Journal, 637, February 1965.
12 For example, see ‘Presentation of Alternative Long Term Naval Programme’, 17 May 1961, UKNA ADM
205/192. For further details see Ian Speller, ‘The Royal Navy, expeditionary operations and the end of empire,
1956-1975’ in Greg Kennedy (ed.), British Naval Strategy East of Suez, 1900-2000: influences and actions,
(2005) chapter 8.
13 Statement on Defence 1962: the Next Five Years, Cmnd.1639.
14 See UKNA ADM 1/29638. ADM 205,192, ‘Presentation of Alternative Long Term Naval Programme’, 17
May 1961.
15 UKNA DEFE 2/2074. COS (61) 180, Seaborne/Airborne/Land concept, 8 June 1961, UKNA DEFE 5/114
16 Manual of Joint Warfare, Vol1, UKNA DEFE 73/1.