Page 150 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo II

790 XXXIX Congresso della CommIssIone InternazIonale dI storIa mIlItare • CIHm

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applied in 1975. The UKMF was disbanded afterwards and 3 Division, again, got a
new role. It became a tank division in Germany as part of the BAOR. After 1990 one
more readjustment was executed. The Division was redesigned as a deployable force
and conducted missions in the Balkans, Iraq and Afghanistan. In a way, the UKMF was
an indicator of British defence priorities.
For NATO, the UK Mobile Force – as the AMF - are excellent historical examples
for NATO’s deployable forces. Moreover, they form a diachronic link from the Cold
War over the turn from 1990 until now, thereby being direct forerunners of the NATO
Response Force.
The position of the Allied Mobile Force in the overall structure of NATO’s strategy
in the Cold War and their importance in the historical context become particularly
clear when we look at the Wintex and HILEX exercises. In addition to the live plans in
the GDPs, these command post exercises were the most important instruments of the
Alliance for preparing for possible crises and wars. They also provide a good overview
of the Alliance’s perception of the enemy and are excellent historical landmarks.
Beginning with Wintex 71, the Wintex exercises were the continuation of the FALLEX
series of the 1960s. Their main purpose was to try out military chains of command and
coordination procedures.
The planners worked on the assumption that, in a direct confrontation, the Warsaw
Pact would try to achieve supremacy by exerting economic, political and military
pressure. Then the enemy would start deploying massive forces in rapid succession on
all the fronts and, maybe, commencing direct aggression.
In order to prevent such a scenario from getting out of hand in an emergency, NATO
established a whole range of deterrence and stabilization tools. Crisis management
procedures were to be applied to calm down the situation right from the start and
minimize tension.
The AMF was an extremely important tool for the lower escalation scenarios. For
this purpose, NATO developed special Rules of Engagement so that appropriate action
could be taken in each situation.
Its deployment in the real trouble spots, northern Norway, Denmark, Istria, northern
Greece or the southern and eastern borders of Turkey, was meant to be a kind of clear
warning. The focus remained on preserving the territorial integrity and political and
military coherence of NATO in Europe even under extreme pressure.
This scenario underwent noticeable extensions during the very first Wintex exercise,
an option that later became a new priority and was to create considerable potential for
conflict within the Alliance. Primarily on the initiative of the United States, the decisive
trigger for simulated confrontation in Wintex 71 was not based on an aggravation of the
situation in Europe, but on a crisis in the Middle East.
The background for this strategic extension was the result of the events the Six-Days
War of 1967. One of the consequences was that the Soviet Union apparently saw this
as an opportunity to start massive political and military commitment. At the same time,
the Americans recognized the weakness of NATO’s whole southern flank. A conflict in
Palestine, causing destabilization in the entire region, would have threatened Turkey