Page 152 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo II

792 XXXIX Congresso della CommIssIone InternazIonale dI storIa mIlItare • CIHm

partners in June 1980. With these documents the strategic perspectives of the Alliance
had expanded once and for all – despite the criticism of the Central Europeans.
All this was fully implemented in HILEX 10 of 1982. The exercise concept was
almost identical with HILEX 9, but at the crucial points included a new key element;
the deployment of the Rapid Defense Force (RDF), which later became the Rapid
Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF), the predecessor of today’s US Central Command.
This led to further discussions. The Europeans assumed, not without good reason,
that the primary interests and sensibilities of the Americans had shifted at least in part
to the Gulf region and were afraid the US reinforcements for Europe would be affected.
Especially the fact that the deployment of the RDF demanded a considerable share of
the US airlift capacities came on agenda. Airlift resources were -and still are!- scarce and
expensive. It was hardly possible to support two major global theatres at the same time
with maximum effort. Furthermore, the RDF units comprised highly mobile and highly
specialized elite units (marines, mechanized and airborne units).
The question of the major RDF units and the problems of the Persian Gulf and the
Middle East continued to be controversial until the end of the Cold War. Fortunately,
despite the War between Iran and Iraq until 1988, the situation in the Middle East
remained more or less stable, so that the strategic plans weren’t put to the test.
Even during the great changes of 1989/90, there was still considerable tension with
regard to these two elements, i.e. the Eurocentric perspective and the expanded outlook
of the Americans with a view to the Middle East and even global scenarios. The issue
got a new thrust by the 2nd Gulf War 1991, which almost coincided with German
reunification. The AMF acquired a prominent role there.
It is one of the last paradoxes of the Cold War era that the first “live” operation of
the AMF took place in 1991, that is to say, after the end of the East-West conflict. When
the situation in the Gulf region got increasingly difficult after the occupation of Kuwait,
Turkey felt threatened by Iraq and called for NATO solidarity.
The following mission presents a very good example for the conditions and problems
which multilateral task forces, in particular those of NATO, have to face when deployed.
In December 1990, Turkey submitted an urgent request via the NATO chain of
command, i.e. via AFSOUTH. The supreme decision-making body for these questions,
the Defence Planning Committee, started to discuss and decide on the request.
As in many previous cases, there was no agreement or consensus at first. National
interests and prerogatives had to be weighed up and reconciled with the interests of the
Alliance.
In this case, the position of Germany in particular was at the center of the
controversies. Turkey had hoped to immediately receive a positive response, and maybe
even invoke Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. In the course of events, Ankara
gave some information to the press and thereby caused considerable irritation in Bonn.
Chancellor Kohl was extremely angered because he hadn’t been informed beforehand
by the Turkish government about their plans for requesting the AMF.
Accordingly, there was little harmony in the debate within the DPC. To the
disappointment of the Turks, the German representative strictly refused to make final