Page 154 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo II

794 XXXIX Congresso della CommIssIone InternazIonale dI storIa mIlItare • CIHm

equipment to the Israelis, offering financial resources instead. This policy, which has
gone down in history as “check book diplomacy”, came under special fire. Various
camps claimed that the Germans had become a nation of shop-keepers who were only
interested in profit and in an emergency would let the others do the real dangerous jobs.
Of course, these and other accusations were purposely aggressive and did not do justice
to the complexity of the situation.
After the Defence Planning Committee finally had achieved the necessary
compromises in the wording, SACEUR issued the activation order and the deployment
began. Since the British and Americans had already stationed massive forces in the Gulf
region, other allies stepped in. The following units were deployed:
1 Alpha Jet squadron (2 Squadron / 43rd Fighter Bomber Wing, Oldenburg)
1 F-104 squadron (Italy)
1 Mirage 5 squadron (Belgium)

The German squadron arrived at Erhac on 8 January 1991, where it began deterrence
operations. The mission was basically successful, although substantial discussions and
differences of opinion about the character of the mission continued.
Meanwhile, considerable practical difficulties arose. The weather was so adverse
at times that sorties had to be cancelled. Furthermore, “Showing the Flag”, for very
technical reasons, proved to be difficult. Here, the very limited performance of the Iraqi
Air Defense played the major role. NATO aircraft could hardly be detected north of
the 40 km air defense identification zone. When the NATO aircraft only slightly turned
further to the north, they disappeared from the Iraqi screens.
Here we see one of the basic problems of the AMF since its creation. On the one
hand, politicians and diplomats in particular feared that the situation would escalate and
that the consequences were unforeseeable – dangers which continue to exist to this day,
albeit in a different form – see Syria. On the other, you cannot deter if you do not make
your presence felt. If you like, all remained a balancing act between deterring the enemy
and being afraid of what reaction might follow.
The specific conditions under which the soldiers had to execute their mission
were rather difficult at first. The logistical structures had to be set up step by step;
the considerable distances repeatedly hindered progress in this. The forces notably
complained about a lack of support from the Host Nation. Much had to be provided
via the long transportation routes from Germany. The commander of the German force,
a lieutenant colonel, also almost a full-time job with receiving members of the public.
In addition to the Turkish president, Özal, the force was visited by the SACEUR,
General Galvin, the German Minister of Defense, Gerhard Stoltenberg, the German
Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces, Alfred Biehle, and many other
dignitaries. The press did not remain idle either and caused a number of considerable
problems. A TV team from the Saarländischer Rundfunk broadcasting station entered
the quarters without permission and conducted interviews. The team was only allowed
to continue after they commited themselves formally to abstain from actions like these.
The crisis was short-lived since the Iraqi combat units were soon defeated by the