Page 153 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo II

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decisions without further consultations. This left Bonn increasingly isolated. Especially
the Americans and the British, who were just deploying huge numbers of troops to the
Gulf region, wanted to get all the NATO partners someway on board at least nominally.
The British representative therefore also accused Germany of being obstructive.
Basically, subsequent debates focused on the specific mission that would be assigned
to the AMF. As in similar cases in the previous decades, there was a tough struggle over
wordings. The Turks, British and Americans worked towards defining the mission of the
AMF as generously as possible. Washington and London probably secretly expected that
the direct involvement of NATO would divert some of Baghdad’s attention to the north.
Maybe there were even some hopes that NATO would intervene militarily. Anyway,
none of these hopes were able to be fulfilled since Germany’s restrictive position left
absolutely no margin for interpretation of the AMF-mission.
It was clear from the very beginning that only the air component of the AMF would be
deployed. The three ground battalions remained at their home bases. In addition, Bonn
also insisted on the wording for the rules of engagement being clear and exactly limited.
The squadrons had to carry out a purely demonstrative mission and were explicitly not
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included in the active air defense of the 6 ATAF. Training flights had to take place
exclusively north of a 40 km zone along the Turkish-Iraqi border. Furthermore, the AMF
units were fundamentally given permission to fire only in self-defense. The British had
hoped to leave a loophole for mutual assistance to be provided between Turkish combat
aircraft and the AMF squadrons for self-defence in case of attack by the Iraqi Air Force.
The Germans prevented this as well. After some time, other NATO partners started to
support Bonn.
The Germans acted primarily for political reasons. It must not be forgotten that
German reunification had only just been achieved and that the concerns of the Eastern
European states had to be taken into consideration. And the Soviet Army was still in
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Germany until 1994. A real taste of danger was supplied on 13 January 1991 when the
Russian Army attacked civilian protesters in Lithuania with Infantry and even tanks. The
result of this Bloody Sunday in Vilnius were hundreds of injured and dead.
Furthermore, the historical burdens were still too much at the fore.
Despite Germany’s caution in all these questions domestic turmoil was not long in
coming. As the Gulf War drew nearer, the number of conscientious objecters soared,
and there were even some in the task forces earmarked in southern Turkey. More than
50 members of the Anti-Air Missile Wing 36 refused to do military service under
the German conscription law. The AMF Air was less affected by this, but was still
automatically in the focus. Pilots of the German AMF contingent spoke very pensively
about the operation in public. The Spiegel magazine wrote repeatedly and with relish
that “fear” was the prevalent feeling among the German personnel - and in German
living rooms.
The damage not least at the international area was enormous. In other countries,
above all in the UK, a flow of commentators appeared in the public and accused the
Germans of collective cowardice. The foreign policy of Hans-Dietrich Genscher fuelled
this criticism even more. Genscher had refused to provide forces or at least military