Page 184 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo II

824 XXXIX Congresso della CommIssIone InternazIonale dI storIa mIlItare • CIHm

Fig. 1. Deep Attack. Field Manual 100-5, Operations, 1982, p. 7-14.

liked to look at the „enemy“ as a system or body with a brain, backbone and eyes.
The Gulf War in 1991 brought about a hype of possibilities of Precision Guided Muni-
tions and Stealth; moreover, the Army could possibly have beaten its opposing side us-
ing fewer troops, which was repeatedly pointed out by the Air Force. On one side this
victory strengthened the self-confidence of the military and its political influence; on
4
the other it enlarged the already enormous belief into technology. Thanks to its quite
decisive effort in Operation Desert Storm, the Air Force seemed to take over the lead in
5
the debate on modern „warfare” in the early 1990s. Air Force Officers such as Warden
and Deptula were strong proponents of a new American way of war.
The New American Way of War was predominantly based on „Airpower“ with its me-
dia-hyped main components of Stealth and PGM. The American military historian Cit-
6
ino names the Operation Desert Storm the „long road back from Vietnam“, in his eyes it
was the most successful military operation in the US military history measured against
the limited ends. 7

4 Lewis, Adrian R.: The American Culture of War: The History of U.S. Military Force from World War II to
Operation Iraqi Freedom and Omaha Beach, New York, 2007, p. 378-383.
5 Again Lewis, The American Culture of War; Linn, Brian M.: Echo of Battle: The Army’s Way of War,
Cambridge, 2007 and Mahnken, Thomas G., Technology and the American Way of War since 1945, New
York, 2008.
6 Mahnken, Technology, p. 157f.
7 Citino, Robert M.: Blitzkrieg to Desert Storm: The Evolution of Operational Warfare, Lawrence, KS:
University of Kansas, 2004, p. 288.