Page 182 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo II

822 XXXIX Congresso della CommIssIone InternazIonale dI storIa mIlItare • CIHm

To think war differently:
from AirLand Battle to Effects-Based Operations

ma Uzh Daniel FUHRER

his paper aims at showing the development and change in the perception of the
T „enemy”, „war” and „warfighting” in the US Army and US Air Force between
1980 and 2000, following, on one hand, the idea of working with military journals and
1
military manuals on the other.
Theoretical approach and method
The main research question in this paper is twofold. First, how is the „enemy“ con-
ceptualized, from which the respective „warfighting“ concept is derived? For exam-
ple, AirLand Battle was looking at the Warsaw Pact as the „enemy“ in Europe; but the
Effects-Based Operations had to be adaptable to every „enemy” and shape of „war”.
Second, the use of the language in respect to the verbal meaning of warfare is equally
interesting. While AirLand Battle clearly wanted to destroy enemy tanks, infantry and
provisions, the „target catalogue“ for the Effects-Based Operations seemed to be wider.
Herein also lies the population as a part of the system which has to be influenced, as is
the case with its morale.

Sources
Following Raths and Meier, the study at hand results in a discourse analysis bound
to two different text corpora or text „levels“; according to which only texts are worked
with. As described already, the key terms and statements in the discourse on „warfight-
ing“ and the „enemy“ shall therefore be shown as an „image of war” discourse.
The analysis of the argumentation of critics and supporters is interesting to under-
stand today’s Western view on modern „war“, and thanks to the publication activity in
the US armed forces, this examination can draw on extensive documents of interest.
Apart from the various publications on military related topics, official military regula-
tions are the second major starting point for this evaluation.

AirLand Battle: After the Vietnam War
Now let us look at some examples from this analysis. After the Vietnam War, the
2
United States Army seemed to dominate doctrine development as general officers such

1 For example „instructions“, „guideline“ or even „guide“ to „war” or „warfighting”.
2 Doctrine is hereby understood to be the institutionalized view in „war” and „warfare”, refer to Headquarters,
Department of the Army: Field Manual 3-0, Operations, Washington, DC, 2008, p. D-1: „Army doctrine is a
body of thought on how Army forces intend to operate as an integral part of a joint force. Doctrine focuses on
how to think—not what to think. It establishes […] How the Army views the nature of operations.”