Page 178 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo II
P. 178

818                                XXXIX Congresso della CommIssIone InternazIonale dI storIa mIlItare • CIHm

           “Inadequate joint force command structure, poor communications, service parochial-
           ism, and a lack of joint exercises – hence joint planning – leading up to the Falklands
           conflict caused the unsuccessful offloading of the Welsh Guard at Fitzroy. These prob-
           lems, exacerbated by the lack of A[nti]E[lectronic]W[arfare], led directly to the loss of
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           56 British lives […]” . Finally the British military intervention on the Falklands paved
           the ground for new political activities and establishing a clear political future framework
           for the Falklands. Colateral damages on the Falklands were restructured by Great Britain
           within short time.
              As Great Britain was defending an own territory – far away from the homeland – an-
           other example could be used to focus on two different forms of “classical” or “tradi-
           tional” war: The involvement of another country into a conflict between neighbours by
           supporting one party or the engagement of another country in their attempts to liberate
           themselves after being invaded. Due to the geography a joint operation for the third
           party is mandatory, which leads directly to a combined operation.
              As example out of the nearer past the operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm
           could be taken. After the invasion of Kuwait, the US took decision to liberate Kuwait.
           USCENTCOM  took charge of operational  command.  Gen. Schwarzkopf (USCINC-
           CENT) designated component commanders for Air, Land, Naval and Marine Forces as
           well as Special Operations. However all operations and forces assigned to the theatre
           remained under the command authority of USCENTCOM. This streamlining of com-
           mand and the fact that the deployment at the beginning of Desert Storm was exercised in
           a coordinated way, which enabled the rapid deployment of more than 500.000 soldiers,
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           120 warships and 1.600 combat aircraft.  The Air Force was used to the quick strategic
           airlift, and later on for theatre airlift, which enabled a rapid build-up of force and com-
           mand structures on the Arabian peninsula. The Naval forces arrived six days after the
           launch of the mission and, from that day, kept on providing the further extensive logisti-
           cal support concerning supply, personnel and vehicles.
              The US military paved the ground for a renewal of diplomacy in order to ensure
           peace and freedom for Kuwait. It should be added that the collateral damages of this
           military interventions had been solved rapidly by Kuwait who were able to do so due to
           their wealth.
              These classical, these traditional wars went more and more out of scope of main mili-
           tary advanced and prudent planning during the last years. Nowadays we are expecting
           the unexpected and planning for scenarios we could not have even thought of a couple
           of years ago. The fight against terrorism or the fight against asymmetric threats have
           changed our military thinking and combines again both homeland security and external
           military activities. Do we have those capabilities needed to address these threats, do the
           well known large organisations have the power to respond to these threats – what are the
           capabilities needed? Are we intending to engage a cyber-attack with machine guns in the
           future? Most probable an answer cannot be found in military means, most probable the
           military have an even more limited role in managing these kind of conflicts. But does the

           3    Bolia, p. 72.
           4    Joint Military Operations Historical Collection (=JMOHC), p. V-3.
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