Page 183 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo II
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          ActA
          as DePuy and Starry promoted the ultimate land war in the 1980s. The concept title
          “AirLand Battle Future” seems to be the fitting terminus in two different ways for the
          first period analyzed until the Gulf War in 1991. The excerpts taken out of the differ-
          ent Field Manual Operations and contemporary articles in the military publications are
          indicative of the perception of the modern „war”.

          A gigantic symphony of destruction
             The „battlefield“ was described as a spacious chaos starting with the manual from
          1982, without any clear linear frontlines. The „enemy“, embodied and impersonated
          as a Soviet „mass“ army, was exaggeratedly thought as gigantic and the Warsaw Pact
          soldier, compared to the Western one, was imagined as being mentally less free, having
          less „initiative“, flexibility and decentralized control. Especially Warsaw Pact officers
          had allegedly a scientific and rigid attitude towards „war“; at the same time the US tried
          to cope with the enemy „mass“ first using scientifically perfected capabilities, then using
          technical means. Military thinkers never abandoned the predominance of „firepower“
          which they saw as a combined arms warfare. AirLand Battle was conceived to be the
          gigantic symphony of destruction of the Warsaw Pacts „masses“. Technology played a
          superior role as it was the means for the defense against a seemingly superior „enemy“,
          even though factors such as „initiative“ or morale were postulated at the same time.
          „Mass“ or also „speed“ stood representative for the gigantism which was propagated.
          The eventual concept of AirLand Battle Future then only described long range „fire-
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          power” to be the effective means.
          From „Battlefield“ to „Battlespace“
             The term „battlefield“ was translated as the Non-linear Battlefield in the scope of
          AirLand Battle, then became larger in AirLand Battle Future and was eventually dubbed
          as Battlespace when discussing the Revolution in Military Affairs. It should then incor-
          porate „space“ and Cyberspace. The multi-dimensional information age as a military
          concept then as well featured termini such as Full Spectrum Dominance or Information
          Dominance. The RMA eventually led to the „Transformation“ which, thanks to the new
          technologies, planned for smaller, more mobile and more lethal units operating in net-
          works. Every soldier should have access to the same situational image simultaneously to
          outclass potential „enemies“ on the enlarged „battlefield“ in the area of decision-making
          as well as in regard of the weapons’ „effects“. „Mass“ and „speed“ were still dominating
          terms in the language of both branches; „speed“ was enforced by the information age,
          „mass “ was reinterpreted.

          Effects-Based Operations: „masses“ of „effects“
          Especially the Air Force tried to bring forward „masses“ of „effects“ and to distance
          itself from the solely physical destruction of the „enemy“. Furthermore the Air Force


          3    Leonhard, Leonhard, Robert R.: The art of maneuver: Maneuver-warfare theory and AirLand battle, Novato,
             1991, p. 235 and 239.
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