Page 183 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo II
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as DePuy and Starry promoted the ultimate land war in the 1980s. The concept title
“AirLand Battle Future” seems to be the fitting terminus in two different ways for the
first period analyzed until the Gulf War in 1991. The excerpts taken out of the differ-
ent Field Manual Operations and contemporary articles in the military publications are
indicative of the perception of the modern „war”.
A gigantic symphony of destruction
The „battlefield“ was described as a spacious chaos starting with the manual from
1982, without any clear linear frontlines. The „enemy“, embodied and impersonated
as a Soviet „mass“ army, was exaggeratedly thought as gigantic and the Warsaw Pact
soldier, compared to the Western one, was imagined as being mentally less free, having
less „initiative“, flexibility and decentralized control. Especially Warsaw Pact officers
had allegedly a scientific and rigid attitude towards „war“; at the same time the US tried
to cope with the enemy „mass“ first using scientifically perfected capabilities, then using
technical means. Military thinkers never abandoned the predominance of „firepower“
which they saw as a combined arms warfare. AirLand Battle was conceived to be the
gigantic symphony of destruction of the Warsaw Pacts „masses“. Technology played a
superior role as it was the means for the defense against a seemingly superior „enemy“,
even though factors such as „initiative“ or morale were postulated at the same time.
„Mass“ or also „speed“ stood representative for the gigantism which was propagated.
The eventual concept of AirLand Battle Future then only described long range „fire-
3
power” to be the effective means.
From „Battlefield“ to „Battlespace“
The term „battlefield“ was translated as the Non-linear Battlefield in the scope of
AirLand Battle, then became larger in AirLand Battle Future and was eventually dubbed
as Battlespace when discussing the Revolution in Military Affairs. It should then incor-
porate „space“ and Cyberspace. The multi-dimensional information age as a military
concept then as well featured termini such as Full Spectrum Dominance or Information
Dominance. The RMA eventually led to the „Transformation“ which, thanks to the new
technologies, planned for smaller, more mobile and more lethal units operating in net-
works. Every soldier should have access to the same situational image simultaneously to
outclass potential „enemies“ on the enlarged „battlefield“ in the area of decision-making
as well as in regard of the weapons’ „effects“. „Mass“ and „speed“ were still dominating
terms in the language of both branches; „speed“ was enforced by the information age,
„mass “ was reinterpreted.
Effects-Based Operations: „masses“ of „effects“
Especially the Air Force tried to bring forward „masses“ of „effects“ and to distance
itself from the solely physical destruction of the „enemy“. Furthermore the Air Force
3 Leonhard, Leonhard, Robert R.: The art of maneuver: Maneuver-warfare theory and AirLand battle, Novato,
1991, p. 235 and 239.

