Page 9 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo II

649
ActA
The Concept of “Repelling Limited and Small-Scale
Aggression without External Assistance”

and Japan-United States Joint Operation

Yasuaki CHIJIWA

Introduction
uring the Cold War, Japan had adopted the concept of so-called “Repelling Lim-
D ited and Small-Scale Aggression without External Assistance” (gentei shōkibo
shinryaku dokuryoku taisho) in its national security policy. This concept first appeared
in the “National Defense Program Outline” which was formulated in October, 1976
(“the NDPO (or bōei taikō) 1976”). The NDPO 1976 mentioned that:
“Should direct aggression occur, Japan will repel such aggression at the earliest possible
stage by taking immediate responsive action and trying to conduct an integrated, system-
atic operation of its defense capability. Japan will repel limited and small-scale aggres-
sion, in principle, without external assistance. In cases where the unassisted repelling of
aggression is not feasible, due to scale, type or other factors of such aggression, Japan
will continue an unyielding resistance by mobilizing all available forces until such time
as cooperation from the United States is introduced, thus rebuffing such aggression.” 1
That concept was also followed in the “Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Coopera-
tion” which was some kind of a basis for joint operation planning in these bilateral rela-
tions and formulated in November, 1978 (“the Guidelines 1978”). The Guidelines said:
“In principle, Japan by itself will repel limited, small-scale aggression. When it is
difficult to repel aggression alone due to the scale, type and other factors of aggression,
Japan will repel it with the cooperation of the United States.” 2
The concept of “Repelling Limited and Small-Scale Aggression without External As-
sistance” had been maintained until the new “NDPO 1995” (formulated in November,
1995) and the new “Guidelines 1997” (formulated in July, 1997) abandoned it in the
aftermath of the Cold War.
What did the concept mean to Japan’s national security policy? Why was that aban-
doned after the end of the Cold War?
There is a trend in Japan today for people to understand its national security policy
through a paradigm of conflict between “Autonomous Defense (or jishu bōei) line” and
the “Japan-U.S. Alliance line.” According to one point of view, the concept of “Repel-
ling Limited and Small-Scale Aggression without External Assistance” was a product of
the “Autonomous Defense line.” This valued Japan’s autonomy from the U.S. because
it had the intention “to repel without external assistance” in spite of the U.S. duty based

1 The National Defense Program Outline 1976 (October 29, 1976).
2 The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (November 27, 1978).