Page 12 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo II

652 XXXIX Congresso della CommIssIone InternazIonale dI storIa mIlItare • CIHm

The reason why the first Guidelines referred to “Repelling Limited and Small-Scale
Aggression without External Assistance” nevertheless was that, in the negotiation, Japa-
nese side recognized “if we did not indicate the description of it to the U.S. at the very
least, Japan might repel all scale aggression without external assistance. Then support
8
from the U.S. would be limited only to make up for deficiencies. That is terrible.” In
other words, this description in the Guidelines stressed to clarify that Japan could not
repel aggression more than limited and small-scale one without American assistance.

Progress of defense force building and Japan-U.s. Defense cooperation
After that, through 1980’s, defense force that the NDPO 1976 targeted gradually
became to build. P-3C antisubmarine aircrafts and F-15 fighters were introduced. Then,
there were increasing interest in operations that was difficult to consider in the era when
defense force was not built enough.
And by formulation of the Guidelines, joint exercises between the SDF and the U.S.
Force boosted. In November, 1978, the Air SDF had first Japan-U.S. joint exercise.
In February, 1980, the Maritime SDF first joined the Rim of the Pacific Exercise. In
November, 1982, the first Japan-U.S. joint field training exercise that assumed the ag-
gression against Japan was conducted. In October, 1986, the first Japan-U.S bilateral
joint exercise was also conducted. Through these exercises and exchanges, role-sharing
between Japan and the U.S. gradually became clear so it became possible to consider
operation concretely.

The end of the cold war and abandonment of the concept of “repelling limited and
small-scale aggression without external assistance”
After the end of the Cold War, the NDPO 1976 and the Guidelines 1978 that were
formulated in the Cold War era were naturally revised. The newly formulated NDPO
1995 said “Should direct aggression occur, take immediate responsive action by con-
ducting an integrated and systematic operation of its defense capabilities, in appropriate
cooperation with the United States, in order to repel such aggression at the earliest pos-
9
sible stage” and the Guidelines 1997 also said “Japan will have primary responsibility
immediately to take action and to repel an armed attack against Japan as soon as possi-
ble. The United States will provide appropriate support to Japan. Such bilateral coopera-
tion may vary according to the scale, type, phase, and other factors of the armed attack.
This cooperation may include preparations for and execution of coordinated bilateral
operations, steps to prevent further deterioration of the situation, surveillance, and intel-
ligence sharing.” In other words, the concept of “Repelling Limited and Small-Scale
10
Aggression without External Assistance” was abandoned.
Regarding that development, Masahiro Akiyama, who was Director of Defense Bu-
reau at that time and initiated to formulate the NDPO 1995, wrote in his memories that:

8 Ibid.
9 The National Defense Program Outline 1995 (November 28, 1995).
10 The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (September 23, 1997).