Page 13 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo II

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“Speaking in the extreme, apart from whether the U.S. military would battle on the
frontline actually, considering there are great U.S. military presence in Japan, when mili-
tary attack against Japan would occur, based on Japan-U.S. military alliance, it would
be inevitable that Japan and the U.S. actually cooperate to repel any scale aggressions
from the very beginning. ‘In one case, Japan would repel it without the U.S. assistance
because the attack is limited and small-scale.’ ‘In the other case, Japan and the U.S. co-
operate because scale of the attack is greater.’ It is nonsense. I thought that it should not
be indicated any concept that differed so much from actual operations.” 11
The concept of “Repelling Limited and Small-Scale Aggression without External As-
sistance” was gradually considered to be unsuitable with any actual operation.

Conclusion
According to verbal evidences by related persons in Defense Agency and the SDF, it
seems that formation and abandonment of the concept of “Repelling Limited and Small-
Scale Aggression without External Assistance” did not have much to do with the para-
digm of “Autonomous Defense vs. the Japan-U.S. Alliance” that scholars on Japan’s
security policy often use. In the 1970’s, the concept was constructed to build the “mini-
mum necessary” defense force after defense force building by counter-threat five-year
plan was deadlocked and indicated in the NDPO 1976. The Guideline that was a basis
for joint operation plan between Japan and the U.S. also did not regard it as operational
concept. However, through 1980’s, as Japan’s defense force building progressed and
joint exercises and exchanges boosted between Japan and the U.S., there were increas-
ing interest in operation. And in the 1990’s, after the end of the Cold War, the concept
was abandoned by operational request.
In short, the concept of “Repelling Limited and Small-Scale Aggression without Ex-
ternal Assistance” played a role to form a bridge between defense force building and
operation in Japan’s security policy from the Cold War era to the post-Cold War era.

11 Masahiro Akiyama, Nichi Bei no Senryaku Taiwa ga Hajimatta: Anpo Sai Teigi no Butai Ura [strategic
dialogues between Japan and the U.S. have started: behind-the-scenes of redefining Japan-U.S. security
partnership] (Tokyo: Aki Shobō, 2002), p. 104.