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fleets. Various facts and figures illustrate this . This duality is also confirmed by the Ceuta
2
campaign, in 1415: the naval fleet that helped transport the troops that took the fortress was
made up of merchant ships, forced to join the enterprise. The same pattern can be seen in
several other Portuguese campaigns in North Africa, in particular Kzar-al-Kibir , in 1578.
This reliance on individual contributions from seamen, fleets or military resources, is
a structural characteristic we need to understand in order to discuss the main topic of this
paper.
In fact, the Portuguese crown did not have a real naval fleet, official army or state ship-
yards able to respond to the increasing shipbuilding needs. Ribeira das Naus, the main state
th

shipyard, was founded in Lisbon by Manuel I at the beginning of the 16 century, in order
to provide carracks for the Cape Route, which private agents could not build in the time
required. But even in the late 16 century it was unable to respond to the trade and defence
th
needs of the crown. Private shipyards, mostly in NW Portugal, were involved in all kinds
of shipbuilding at the request of the crown, principally concerned with the Cape Route. The
Portuguese naval fleet itself was largely owned by private investors .
3
Monographs on Portuguese seaports have shown that not only shipbuilding, but over-
all naval logistics of the Portuguese overseas expansion was secured by individuals who
responded to the logistical needs of the crown, while they were favourable to them. Even
technical knowledge was handed down through endogamic and familial transmission, with
children going on board ship with their parents, and through apprenticeship contracts like
those used in the traditional crafts .
4
In fact, the first attempt to establish a marine body was made in 1676, and stipulates the
constitution of a corps of 300 seafarers in regular service, earning a fixed wage and having
clearly specified rights and obligations .
5
It is therefore agreed, based on the facts, that there was no royal navy, nor was there a
body of seafarers trained exclusively for military purposes, if we exclude the bombardiers
(the only military members with specific military skills and formal training, with the first
regulation establishing it dating from 1626) . The entire crew was also the military gar-
6
rison. That is why the Portuguese crown determined in a 1571 rule that the size of the crew

2 See, for instance, the 1380 Lei que instituiu a Companhia das Naus. in Os descobrimentos Portugueses.
Documentos para a sua História, dir. J.M. da Silva Marques, Lisboa, INIC, 1988, tomo I, p. 171-173 or the
1317 contract between the king Dinis and Manuel Pessanha, a Genoes, nominated almiral of the Portuguese
navy in Os descobrimentos Portugueses. Documentos para a sua História, dir.. J.M. da Silva Marques,
Lisboa, INIC, 1988, tomo 1, p. 29.
3 . Cf. Polónia, Amélia - Expansão e Descobrimentos numa perspectiva local. O porto de Vila do Conde no sé-
culo XVI, Lisboa, IN-CM, 2007, vol. 1and 2; Barros, Amândio – Porto. A construção de um espaço marítimo
no século XVI, Porto, 2004, vol. 1.
4 Polónia, Amélia - Self organising networks in the construction of the Portuguese overseas empire.
IMEHA2008 - 5th International Congress of Maritime History (International Maritime Economic Associa-
tion) (Greenwich, 23-27 Junho 2008).
5 Alvará e Regimento de criação do troço de trezentos marinheiros pagos in “Os regimentos sobre a matrícula
dos oficiais da navegação, da ribeira e bombardeiros de 1591 e 1626”, publ. COSTA, Leonor Freire in. “Re-
vista de História Económica”, 25, Jan-April 1989, p. 122-125.
Traslado do Regimento sobre os offiçiaes da Nauegação..., publ. “loc. cit.”, p. 103
6 Traslado do Regimento sobre os offiçiaes da Nauegação..., in “loc.cit., p. 119-120.