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               the book Supplying War, published in 1977, by Martin van Creveld stand forth as a
          milestone in the writing of military history. He stresses that logistical problems were the de-
          terminant factor in warfare. Van Creveld tells us that armies in the Age of Napoleon used the
          method of living off the country because enough supplies could never be stored in advance
          and convoys were never enough. At the same time he emphasizes the importance of local
          resources. He suggests that Napoleon and his way of making war were no exception. Van
          Creveld says that it is true that Napoleon transformed the art of warfare in many ways, but
          he never freed himself from the tyranny of logistics and his dependence of local resources.
          In fact he used the same logistical method as earlier armies when living off the country. 3
               In this way van Creveld connects war with local society through the armies’ desperate
          need of local resources. Unfortunately, van Creveld does not explain more in detail what he
          means by “living of the country”. He uses the term as distinct from the methods of forward-
          ing supplies from depots established in advance. Living off the country in van Crevelds
          terminology is almost the same thing as foraging than on march. John A. Lynn makes this
          point in the anthology Feeding Mars. He writes that the term “living of the country” hides
          a good deal of variety. The principle of living off the country have been used by almost ev-
          ery army in the history of warfare before the First World War, but the methods have varied.
          During the century before the Napoleonic Wars the armies of the great nations in Europe
          began to use more organized supply systems. After years of plundering, which were in fact
          a very inefficient way of getting food, during the Thirty Years War different forms of regular
          taxes and contributions became means of maintaining an army in an occupied area. Raising
          contributions became a way of making war feed war. One method of utilizing the resources
          was by giving the soldiers money so that they could buy food for themselves. A third way
          of supplying an army was the étapes system, with armies drawing their provisions from lo-
          cal markets or depots at intervals along theirs march. Sometimes the local authorities set up
          a market where soldiers and commissaries could buy what they needed. The armies did not
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          have to foraging for food, since they knew it would be there waiting for them  How did the
          armies use the local resources during the Napoleonic Wars?

          suPPly systeMs during the naPOleOnic wars
             How the local resources were exploited during the Napoleonic Wars varied from time
          to time. Different methods were also used in different parts of Europe. The preconditions
          were very different in let say Russia and Flanders. The population density together with the
          stage of development of communication decided the possibilities to feed an army. It is also
          important to understand that the organization of the armies, not least how the soldiers were
          recruited, affected the supply system and how the armies were feed.
               The French armies under the command of Napoleon never had a sufficient supply sys-
          tem. Although Napoleon made some efforts to improve the supply system, and despite his
          pronouncement that “an army marches on its stomach”, he was most of all an improviser.
          His strategy was base on rapid movement. Big baggage trains were therefore no solution.

          3   Creveld, Martin van, Supplying War, London 1977, p. 40f.
          4   Lynn, John A. Feeding Mars. Logistics in Western warfare from the Middle Ages to the Present, Oxford
              1993, p. 15f.
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