Page 302 - Conflitti Militari e Popolazioni Civili - Tomo II

804 XXXIV Congresso della CommIssIone InternazIonale dI storIa mIlItare • CIHm

wording Ep (Ejercito del Pueblo - People’s Army) close to the denomination Farc, to under-
line the formulation of a new operational and strategic conception as revolutionary Army:
since then they began the so-called NFO (Nueva Forma de Operar- New way of Operating),
trying to combine guerrilla warfare tactics with forms of semi-conventional war. In the early
1990s there was the complete transition toward the movement war through the deployment
of large military unities. Farc-Ep in fact, taking advantage of the truce wanted by Betan-
cur’s government, had succeeded in increasing their strength, building and consolidating
their “war economy” thanks to the practice of the extortions in the areas characterized by the
exploitation of natural resources (coca and banana plantations) and cattle breeding. More-
over, the organization had also succeeded in territorial expansion, controlling vast areas of
the country where the State’s presence was weak or even nonexistent. Another turning-point
year was 1998, as Pastrana’s government started a process of the State and Army’s reorga-
nization, after making a strong relationship with United States. Farc was forced to modify
their military strategy once again. The Army’s strengthening and its strategic change led Farc
to retreat, thus resuming guerrilla warfare. Only in this way was the insurgent organization
able to protect itself from the technological modernization of the state military apparatus and
from the strong offensive which, since 2002, has been representing the strategic core of the
current right-wing government.
The Farc’s strategy, unchanged in all this time, was clear and could be referred to as
“the strategy of the prolonged popular war”, adopted to try to wear down the enemy in an
extended period of time. Therefore, survival and strength of the organization have basically
depended on two aspects: the incredible flexibility at organizational level and the flexibility
of their political message. In fact, on one hand the hierarchy and the discipline have always
gone with a high degree of decentralization, giving the opportunity of a larger expansion and
an increasing ability to control territory and resources. On the other hand, following a purely
pragmatic method, the Farc in their discourse has combined elements of the Marxist ideology
with elements of national-populist inspiration in such a way that it is possible to speak about
a sort of “Farian culture”. Besides, depending on the circumstances, they have subordinated
the political discourse to military logic .
38
As many analysts noticed, the lack of solution for such a long conflict depends primarily
on State’s inability to reply adequately to the long term strategy and Farc’s great ability of
organization and adaptation. All state measures adopted have always proposed short-term
strategies and policies, changing continuously depending on the choices of the incumbent
government .
39
Now we will analyze the main aspects of the paramilitary phenomenon. The first inputs
to the creation of civilians’ armed groups, aimed at the “national defense” in aid of the Army

38 In order to underline this large flexibility, Ortiz R. named an essay on the Farc, “Guerriglia mutante” (Mu-
tant insurgency) in Leal Buitrago F. Editor, En la encrucijada. Colombia en el siglo XXI, Bogotà, Editorial
Norma, 2006.
39 See Leal F., “Politicas de seguridad” in Leal editor, 2006; Restrepo, “Los dilemas de la paz en Colombia: las
politicas de los dos ultimos gobiernos antes el conflicto armado” in Helfrich e Kurtenbach (Eds), Colombia,
caminos para salir de la violencia, Madrid, Iberoamericana, 2006; Mejia Maria Emma, “Insurgency, Narco-
terrorism and the Colombian Peace Process”, in Germani Editor, Pathways out of terrorism and insurgency:
the dynamics of terrorist violence and peace processes, 2005, pp. 320-332.