Page 303 - Conflitti Militari e Popolazioni Civili - Tomo II

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Forces, were given by the Colombian government since the 1960’s, inside the largest USA
strategy of struggle against communism . In 1968 the Law 48 introduced the juridical prin-
40
ciple of defense from “internal threat”, meaning the beginning of a legitimation process, not
only of a larger power concentration in the military’s hands (through the recurrent procla-
mation of the state of siege), but also through active population collaboration in contrasting
the insurgent rebellion. Since the beginning a drug trafficker group based in Medellin took
advantage of that ambiguous legitimation of the armed self-defense. In 1982, to protect their
huge economic interests, they formed the MAS (Muerte a los Secuestradores - Death to the
Kidnappers) in order to suppress guerrilla groups which practiced extortions and kidnap-
pings. In the 1980s this phenomenon spread widely thanks to the support and the complicity
of different society sectors, and above all the State’s apparatus . Under the Turbay Ayala
41
government (1978-1982), they promulgated a very repressive security statute inciting popu-
lation to arm itself in order to support state authorities. The privatization of the security was
not only legitimated and promoted but it also received Military Forces’ aid and protection.
Paramilitary groups’ creation and development were also promoted by landowners and cattle
breeders, the main victims of the guerrilla criminal actions, who began to finance private
armies for their personal security. For this reason many paramilitary leaders belong to that
social layer. Romero, one of the most important analysts of the Colombian conflict, under-
lines another important aspect: the tight connection between the growth of the paramilitarism
and the peace policies promoted by the Betancur government (1982-1986) . in the author’s
42
opinion, during those years the paramilitary action became stronger with the aim to stop the
dialogue between the government and Farc, which had already made deals, that among other
things, permitted Farc the foundation of an alternative political party, the UP (Unión Pa-
triótica - the Patriotic Union). As the new party’s success was large and its increase in consent
more and more ample, the counterinsurgent offensive was terribly violent and nearly all UP’s
activists were murdered. The appearance of paramilitarism and the upsurge in violence in
those years for political and social aims is known as the “Guerra Sucia” (the Dirty War) . Be-
43
tween 1994 and 1997 paramilitaries carried out the greatest organizational effort in order to
assemble the various armed groups under a single command, trying, moreover, to assume a
clear political profile. After the birth of the ACCU (Peasant Self-Defense Forces of Córdoba
and Urabá), the federative project was realized at a national level through the creation of the
AUC (United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia). The main purpose of the AUC’s principal
leader Carlos Castaño was the formation of a real counterinsurgent force, able to enter the
conflict as a recognized “third party,” particularly since 1998 when Pastrana’s new govern-
ment (1998-2002) resumed negotiations with guerrilla groups. The ambiguous collaboration
and complicity between paramilitaries and the State in the counterinsurgent war deteriorated

40 See leal F., La seguridad nacional a la deriva. Del Frente Nacional a la Posguerra Frìa, Ceso, Alfaomega,
Clacso, 2002.
41 Gutiérrez F. e Baròn M., “Estado, control territorial paramilitar y orden polìtico en Colombia”, Nuestra
guerra sin nombre, 2006.
42 Romero M., Paramilitares y autodefensas. 1982 – 2003, Bogotà, Editorial Planeta Colombiana – IEPRI,
2003
43 Pécaut D., Crònica de cuatro décadas de polìtica colombiana, Bogotà, Editorial Norma, 2006, p. 393.