Page 52 - Conflitti Militari e Popolazioni Civili - Tomo II

554 XXXIV Congresso della CommIssIone InternazIonale dI storIa mIlItare • CIHm

National Party implemented a policy that accentuated racial differences and segregation.
From 1948 to 1954, under the leadership of Malan, and after that under the leadership of
J.G. Strijdom and H.F. Verwoerd, the National Party government passed various apartheid
laws and implemented measures to transform South Africa into a country where racism was
institutionalised.
In the years following unification (1910) up to the founding of the Republic (1961), the
Anglo-Boer War, and in particular the suffering associated with the white internment camps,
formed an important part of many Afrikaners’ historical (and political) frame of reference.
Since most inhabitants of the internment camps never resolved their trauma successfully, this
psychological collateral damage was transferred to their children. In the minds of many Af-
rikaners, there was the idea that what the Afrikaner had to go through during the Anglo-Boer
War, should never again happen to “us”.
The excessive emphasis on the protection of their own interests meant that the next logi-
cal step, namely to prevent universal oppression and suffering, was never taken by the Af-
rikaner. The Afrikaners had not learnt from their history and they, who had been humiliated
and oppressed earlier, and who suffered an immense amount of collateral damage, became
the new oppressors (of black and coloured people) from 1948 onwards under the colours
of apartheid. In this way, the traumatised from the era of the Anglo-Boer War (and their
descendants) became the new traumatisers – and caused a new wave of collateral damage,
to the detriment of mutual relationships in South Africa, and to the disadvantage of the “non-
white” inhabitants of the country.
The traumatisation of the largest part of South African society continued after South Af-
rica became a republic on 31 May 1961 (i.e. exactly 59 years after the end of the Anglo-Boer
War), and at the same time, there was an ever-increasing sense of alienation among the races.
South Africa’s relations with the outside world were also gradually affected, an aspect that
led to increasing isolation in sport, the imposition of a mandatory United Nations arms em-
bargo in November 1977 and economic pressure. This in turn led to the emergence of a siege
and laager mentality in a large sector of the Afrikaner community. 56
Meanwhile (from 1966), South Africa was involved in an armed struggle against the
South-West African People’s Organisation (SWAPO), who fought for the independence of
Namibia, a situation that led to the government introducing compulsory military service for
all white males. The result was that thousands of people were traumatised, over and above
the massive destruction and disruption caused in the north of Namibia and especially in cer-
tain parts of Angola, where the South African Defence Force became embroiled in the civil
war on the side of UNITA against the MPLA and its Cuban and other communist allies. So,
South Africa’s neighbouring states experienced serious collateral damage. A country like
Angola (littered with millions of landmines) is still suffering the consequences of first a lib-
eration struggle and then a civil war, which altogether lasted for nearly 40 years. 57
On the home front, the violence that erupted in Soweto and elsewhere (and the concomi-
tant collateral damage), had a negative effect on South Africa’s position internationally. The

56 Giliomee, pp. 578-589.
57 As far as South Africa’s role in Namibia and Angola is concerned, and the collateral damage suffered by
people in those countries, see, for example, W. Steenkamp, South Africa’s border war, 1966-1989 (Johannes-
burg, 1989) and F.J. du T. Spies, Operasie Savannah: Angola 1975-1976 (Pretoria, 1989).