Page 47 - Conflitti Militari e Popolazioni Civili - Tomo II

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and put Lieutenant-General John French in charge of operations. In practice, only about
3 000 Cape Afrikaners took up arms during the second rebellion, but the guerrilla war in the
Cape Colony dragged on until the cessation of hostilities. The war in that operational zone
was characterised by exceptional brutality, inter alia, because the war in the Cape Colony
was in effect a civil war. Reference has already been made to the fate of Abraham Esau and
the events at Leliefontein. There are also many other examples of atrocities committed by
both sides. At Naroegas (23 May 1901), in the northwestern Cape Colony, wounded Boers
were allegedly stoned to death. When Boer and/or rebel commandos captured blacks and
35
coloureds who, as loyal British subjects, had taken up arms against the republican invaders
and the rebels, these captives were usually summarily executed. 36
In a desperate effort to quell the rebellion and discourage more Cape Afrikaners from tak-
ing up arms, the British authorities tried the rebels who had been caught for treason. A total
of 435 were condemned to death, but only 44 were executed, including the well-known
37
Commandant Gideon Scheepers. once again, Kitchener was magnanimous in pardoning
38
so many rebels. However, the execution (murder) of so many blacks and coloureds, and the
trials and public executions of rebels (which civilians were sometimes forced to attend), plus
the burning of farms in the Cape Colony (by both the British and the Boers, albeit on a lim-
ited scale) traumatised a large proportion of the Cape’s inhabitants.

By the end of 1901, the British forces’ counter-guerrilla strategy of directed severity be-
gan to yield results; however, in the western Transvaal and in the northern and north-eastern
Free State, the Boer commandos (under the command of General Koos de la Rey and Gen-
eral Christiaan de Wet respectively) pursued the guerrilla war relentlessly and with relative
success. No wonder, therefore, that the British forces’ counter-guerrilla operations in the
western Transvaal and in the northern and north-eastern Free State were more comprehen-
sive (and more forceful) than in other parts of the war zone. For example, from February to
May 1902, in the northern and north-eastern Free State, Kitchener launched five so-called
“new model drives” in an attempt to contain De Wet’s commandos. the civilians in these
39
areas suffered more, in certain respects, and they were more traumatised than civilians in
other parts of the war zone.

35 J. Strauss, “Die veldslag van Naroegas”, Kronos 21, November 1994, pp. 16-31; M. Legasick, “The battle of
Naroegas: context, historiography, sources and significance”, Kronos 21, November 1994, pp. 32-60.
36 See, for example, Wessels (ed.), “Die oorlogsherinneringe van kommandant Jacob Petrus Neser”, pp. 89-91
and F. Pretorius, “Boer attitudes to Africans in wartime” in D. Lowry (ed.), The South African War reap-
praised (Manchester, 2000), pp. 105, 108-109, 119 (note 23).
37 G. Jooste and A. Oosthuizen, So het hulle gesterf: gedenkboek van teregstelling van Kaapse rebelle en repu-
blikeinse burgers tydens die Anglo-Boereoorlog 1899-1902 (Pretoria, 1998), passim; J.H. Snyman, “Rebel-
le-verhoor in Kaapland gedurende die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog met spesiale verwysing na die militêre howe
(1899-1902)”, Archives Year Book for South African History 25, 1962, pp. 1-73.
38 See, for example, G.S. Preller, Scheepers se dagboek en die stryd in Kaapland (1 Okt. 1901 – 18 Jan. 1902)
(Cape Town, 1938) and T. & D. Shearing, Commandant Gideon Scheepers and the search for his grave
(Sedgefield, 1999).
39 See, for example, Hattingh and Wessels, pp. 115-119; Amery (ed.), 5, pp. 475-494, 554-556, 578-579.