Page 46 - Conflitti Militari e Popolazioni Civili - Tomo II

548 XXXIV Congresso della CommIssIone InternazIonale dI storIa mIlItare • CIHm

had already surrendered); the Zulu attack on the commando of Field-Cornet Jan Potgieter at
Holkrans on 6 May 1902 (when the Boers were literally caught asleep and 52 of them died in
the subsequent battle); and the British forces’ scorched-earth policy (which, as indicated,
27
left approximately 30 000 Boer farmsteads and 40 towns and villages destroyed, and led to
tens of thousands of white and black civilians being interned in camps, where about 28 000
white and at least 23 000 black civilians died). The legacy of suspicion, bitterness and even
hatred that remained, strained relations in South Africa long after the conflict had been con-
cluded.
It was not only civilians in the Transvaal and Orange Free State who were traumatised.
The war affected the Cape Colony right from the outbreak of hostilities when the Boers in-
vaded the northwestern Cape, albeit only on a limited scale, to lay siege to Mafikeng and
28
Kimberley. On 13 November 1899, there was also a limited invasion of the northeastern
29
Cape and the Boer forces occupied towns such as Aliwal North, Colesberg, Burgersdorp and
Jamestown. The Boer invasions put the Cape Afrikaners (who constituted some 60 % of
30
the white population of about 400 000 in the Cape Colony) in a very difficult position, as they
were torn between their loyalty towards the British Empire (and in particular a genuine love
for Queen Victoria), and their sympathy towards their fellow Afrikaners to the north of the
orange River. Blood is thicker than water, and in practice, some 10 000 rebelled and took
31
up arms against the British. In February 1900, when Roberts’ indirect strategy succeeded in
driving the Boers from Cape territory, the Cape rebels were left in the lurch. Some of them,
fearing prosecution, accompanied the republican forces in their retreat northwards, while
32
others stayed behind to face the music. At the end of 1900, the Boers – as part of their elabo-
rate guerrilla strategy – once again invaded the Cape Colony. In December 1900, two fairly
large commandos entered the Cape Colony, and in February 1901, even De Wet invaded,
33
though he was soon forced to return to the Orange River Colony. 34
Fearing a large-scale rebellion, Kitchener sent thousands of troops to the Cape Colony

27 a. Wessels, Die militêre rol van swart mense, bruin mense en Indiërs tydens die Anglo-Boereoorlog (1899-
1902) (Bloemfontein, 1998), pp. 27-30; B. Nasson, Abraham Esau’s war: a black South African War in
the Cape Colony 1899-1902 (Cambridge, 1991), passim; J. Laband, “Zulus and the war” in Gooch, (ed.),
pp. 123-124; H.J. Botha, “Die moord op Derdepoort, 25 November 1899: nie-blankes in oorlogsdiens”,
Militaria 1(2), 1969, pp. 3-98.
28 See, for example, B. Gardner, Mafeking: a Victorian legend (London, 1966) and I.R. Smith (ed.), The siege
of Mafeking (2 volumes, Johannesburg, 2001).
29 See, for example, B. Gardner, The lion’s cage (London, 1969) and H.J. Terblanch, Die beleg van Kimberley
(M.A., Potchefstroom University, 1974).
30 Breytenbach, 1, pp. 447-455; Amery (ed.), 2, pp. 292-294; Maurice (ed.), 1, p. 275; C.J.S. Strydom, Kaa-
pland en die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog (Cape Town, 1943), pp. 42-43.

31 See, for example, J.H. Snyman, Die Afrikaner in Kaapland 1892-1902 (D.Litt., Potchefstroom University,
1974).
32 See, for example, A. Wessels (ed.), “Die oorlogsherinneringe van kommandant Jacob Petrus Neser”, Chris-
tiaan de Wet-annale 7, 1987, p. 27 et seq.
33 See, for example, A. de Wet et al., Die Buren in der Kapkolonie im Kriege mit England (Munich, s.a.), p. 87
et seq. and R.D. McDonald, In die skaduwee van die dood (Cape Town, 1943), p. 22 et seq.
34 See, for example, Amery (ed.), 5, pp. 131-157 and W.L. von R. Scholtz, Generaal Christiaan de Wet as
veldheer (D.Litt., University of Leiden), pp. 321-370.