Page 45 - Conflitti Militari e Popolazioni Civili - Tomo II

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although conflict (struggle, war) is a Leitmotiv in the history of the Afrikaner, this does
not necessarily mean that Afrikaners had a proper understanding of war (military conflict). It
sometimes appears as if there were Afrikaners who held the view that Buller, then Roberts,
and later Kitchener came to (or had to come to) South Africa to lose the war! From a military
point of view, it has to be noted that the purpose of war is to defeat the enemy and to subject
the defeated to the victor’s will. 25
Through the ages, it has always been innocent civilians who suffered most during wars
– and innocent civilians continue to bear the brunt of present-day conflicts. In the South Af-
rican context, however, the Anglo-Boer War is prominent as a conflict in which civilians had
intentionally been targeted by a military strategy – and since then, numerous examples can
be found in history – and for this reason, this war, more than any other local conflict, had an
incredibly negative effect on the civilian population (white and black). In a military sense,
Roberts and Kitchener did not have much choice other than to implement a scorched-earth
policy, and to move civilians into camps. These British commanders’ orders were clear: de-
feat the Boer republics. Thus, they would indeed use all the means at their disposal to achieve
victory. In practice, however, their actions not only left a trail of collateral damage and physi-
cal destruction, but also a legacy of bitterness and even hatred – and thousands of traumatised
civilians, both white and black.
Ideally, the British had to defeat the Boers in the field. However, the Boers’ guerrilla
strategy made such a defeat almost impossible. Although Roberts occupied Bloemfontein
on 13 March 1900 and Pretoria on 5 June 1900, the last time the British did battle with a
fairly large Boer force was on 10 March 1900 at Abrahamskraal-Driefontein. The Boer com-
mandos were dispersed rather than defeated. If the British truly felt they were forced to
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destroy Boer farmsteads and towns, ideally they should not have transported white and black
civilians in open train carriages, but in passenger trains; they should not have housed them in
tents, but in buildings with adequate ventilation and sanitary facilities; and they should have
ensured that adequate food supplies and medical facilities were available. In a time of war,
however, an enemy occupation force does not operate along these lines. It is self-evident that
the British, in the first place, had to take care of their own soldiers’ nutritional and medical
needs – an aspect that also left much to be desired for some time.
However, it was not only the internment camps that impacted negatively on relations in
South Africa and led to trauma. Relations were also strained by other traumatic events dur-
ing the war, such as at Derdepoort on 25 November 1899 (when members of the baKgatla
tribe attacked a Boer settlement, killed seven men and two women, and abducted seventeen
women and children); the murder of Abraham Esau (the coloured man who was tortured at
Calvinia by the invading Boer commando and who was killed on 5 February 1901); the Boer
attack at Leliefontein on 27 January 1902 when approximately 30 coloured people were
shot or beaten to death by General Manie Maritz and his commando (some even after they

25 For a discussion of the strategic purpose of war, see, for example, Wessels, Die Britse militêre strategie,
pp. 90-98. See in general also C. von Clausewitz, On war (London, 1968), H.E. Eccles, Military concepts
and philosophy (New Jersey, 1965) and F. Maurice, British strategy: a study of the application of the princi-
ples of war (London, 1929).
26 A. Wessels (ed.), Lord Roberts and the war in South Africa 1899-1902 (Stroud, 2000), p. 38.