Page 48 - Conflitti Militari e Popolazioni Civili - Tomo II

550 XXXIV Congresso della CommIssIone InternazIonale dI storIa mIlItare • CIHm

By May 1902, the Boers’ situation was hopeless. By then Kitchener had been ruthlessly
successful. He had forced the Boers on commando into a position where most of them had
given up hope. On the conclusion of negotiations between Boer delegates at Vereeniging,
British conditions for surrender were accepted on 31 May 1902, with 54 votes to six (as has
been indicated earlier). As reasons for their decision to surrender, the Boers referred, inter
alia, to the decline in the number of Boer combatants in the field; their lack of horses, arms
and ammunition; the overwhelming numerical superiority of British forces and resources;
the fact that European powers were not willing to intervene in the interests of the Boers; the
increasing number of black and coloured people who served on the British side (in this re-
gard, the events at Holkrans, to which reference has already been made, played a significant
role); and the fate of the Boer women and children in the internment camps. What the del-
40
egates at Vereeniging did not realise was that, owing to the reforms in the camps, introduced
after the Fawcett Commission’s visits, conditions in the camps had improved considerably
by May 1902 and the mortality rate had decreased. (In October 1901, the death-rate peaked
at over 3 000 per month, but fewer than 200 died in May 1902.) 41
By May 1902, there were still approximately 21 000 Boers in the field on the republican
side. At one stage (May 1901) Kitchener had approximately 240 000 white British soldiers
under his command. All told, at least 448 435 white soldiers served in the war on the British
side. As the war dragged on, the British used an increasing number of blacks and coloureds
in the struggle against the Boers, both in a non-combatant capacity (for example as servants)
and a combatant capacity (for example as spies, guides, blockhouse guards and as members
of flying columns). By the end of the war, some 5 000 former republican burghers had,
42
after surrendering, thrown in their lot with the British (i.e. they had become joiners), because
they no longer believed in the Boer cause and wanted to end the destructive conflict as soon
as possible. Thus, about 20 % of all Afrikaners who were still under arms in May 1902
43
fought on the side of the British. The fact that Boer fought against Boer, led to divisions in
Afrikaner ranks during and after the war – and to much trauma.
The fact that the war had ended with the loss of republican independence left most of the
bittereinders (bitter-enders, die-hards) and their families filled with dismay. As time passed,
most Afrikaners accepted the outcome of the peace negotiations – there were indeed pressing
needs that had to be attended to urgently. However, some bittereinders’ unhappiness with the
conditions of surrender led to their believing that some of the negotiators had sold out the
Boers at Vereeniging and Pretoria. 44
Like many Germans after the First World War, some Afrikaners believed, albeit errone-
ously that they were not actually defeated militarily in the war, and could therefore have

40 Kestell and Van Velden, pp. 203-205.
41 P.G. Cloete, The Anglo-Boer War: a chronology (Pretoria, 2000), p. 344.
42 See, for example, Wessels, Die militêre rol van swart mense, bruin mense en Indiërs tydens die Anglo-Boe-
reoorlog (1899-1902) and Warwick, Black people and the South African War, 1899-1902.
43 See, for example, A. Grundlingh, The dynamics of treason: Boer collaboration in the South African War of
1899-1902 (Pretoria, 2006).
44 See, for example, Wessels (ed.), “Die oorlogsherinneringe van kommandant Jacob Petrus Neser”, pp. 103-
105, 109-112.