Page 43 - Conflitti Militari e Popolazioni Civili - Tomo II

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After the battle at Sannaspos (31 March) 1900, but especially in the course of the second
half of 1900 and thereafter, the British found themselves increasingly embroiled in what
may be regarded, in retrospect, as a Vietnam-like (or Iraq-like) situation. At that time, Brit-
ain, as the world’s only superpower, had at its disposal a formidable army with remarkably
extensive experience in colonial warfare. Nonetheless, this army was neither prepared nor
equipped for a war against an enemy that had modern arms available, was mobile and could
live off the veld, in a manner of speaking; in other words, an opponent that was not dependent
on large formal provisions depots and their associated logistical infrastructure.
During the guerrilla phase of the Anglo-Boer War, the conflict escalated geographically
(in other words, the war spread over a larger geographical area ), a situation that intensely
17
frustrated the British Army Command. In the course of time, they developed and applied a
comprehensive anti-guerrilla strategy. This entailed, among other actions, building approxi-
mately 8 000 blockhouses, crisscrossing the war zone, the implementation of hot-pursuit
18
operations and military drives, and – to eliminate the Boer commandos’ most important
source of information, food and shelter – the destruction of Boer farms, an action that was
launched as early as the autumn of 1900. As a matter of fact, the first Boer farm home-
stead was burnt down in the second week of January 1900 in the south-western Orange Free
State, even before Roberts started his advance.
19
During the Anglo-Boer War, the distinction between soldiers and civilians, combatants
and non-combatants, in due course became blurred; and likewise, clearly defined operational
fronts fell away during the guerrilla phase of the conflict. Civilian casualties (collateral dam-
age), including deaths in internment camps, henceforth had military significance; for exam-
ple, news (or even rumours) about the plight of loved ones in camps made burghers serving
in commando units think seriously about their role in the continuation of the struggle. On
another level, the idea that military conflict should be coupled with respect for the enemy,
gradually faded away. In this sense, the Anglo-Boer War was – albeit on a small scale – a
precursor of the total wars of the twentieth century.
Since the farms indeed formed part of the republican forces’ logistical and information
network, many Boer farms were legitimate military targets, and in a military sense, British
actions were justified. The British internment camp system, which flowed from the scorched-
earth policy, should therefore not be assessed in isolation. In practice, this strategy led to
the destruction of approximately 30 000 farmsteads, including outbuildings, as well as the
homes of thousands of black labourers, and also the partial or total destruction of approxi-
mately 40 towns and villages. In some cases, the homes of innocent persons (i.e. those who
did not render assistance to the commandos), were also destroyed. Apart from the enormous
material losses suffered by the Boers, the most important consequence of the scorched-earth
policy was the fact that thousands of black and white civilians were left without shelter. To
ensure that the (white and black) civilians would not play any further role in support of the
Boer war effort, and not for humanitarian reasons, the British decided to establish camps

17 The Boer invasion of the Cape Colony in December 1900 is a case in point.
18 For an outline of the British blockhouse system in the war, see, for example, J. Hattingh and A. Wessels,
Britse fortifikasies in die Anglo-Boereoorlog (1899-1902) (Bloemfontein, 1999), p. 19 et seq.
19 Breytenbach, 4, p. 85.