Page 39 - Conflitti Militari e Popolazioni Civili - Tomo II

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their relatively easy victory over the (small) British force in South Africa during the Trans-
vaal War of Liberation, and because they underestimated the British Army’s fighting ability
and resolve. Although both sides initially saw it as a “gentleman’s” war, as well as a white
4
man’s war, the conflict was from the start neither the one nor the other. 5
As far as resources were concerned, the British Empire (the world’s only superpower in
those years) by far overshadowed the two small Boer republics. The British Army could – if
the Indian Army was included – field more than a million soldiers (i.e. five times the total
white population of the two Boer republics), including 235 500 white permanent force sol-
diers. In practice, however, a large portion of the Army was deployed around the globe in
the Empire’s many colonies. On the eve of the war in South Africa, there were only 22 104
British soldiers in or en route to South Africa. together with the local colonial units, the
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British initially had only about 27 000 soldiers in the war zone.
7
The Boers’ resources were very limited. Neither the Transvaal nor the Orange Free State
(OFS) had standing armies. Their only regular forces were their respective state artillery
and police forces, but they numbered in total only about 2 500. The artillery was armed with
modern French and German guns, but in total there were fewer than 100 artillery pieces. The
mainstay of the republican armed forces consisted of citizen armies, i.e. the approximately
32 500 Transvaal and 22 500 Free State burghers (male citizens, between sixteen and 60
years of age) that were eligible for military service. These men were organised in a decen-
tralised commando system, whose officers were democratically elected – which in practice
meant that the best persons were not always placed in positions of command. Like most of
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the ordinary burghers, the majority of the officers, including generals, were farmers with no
formal military training and very little if any theoretical knowledge of the art of war.
The British planned to follow a defensive strategy initially, defending the garrison towns
and strategic communication (especially railway) links as best as possible, until sufficient
reinforcements arrived, so that they could then go on the offensive. Initially, the plan was
to concentrate the vast majority of the assembled army corps south of the Orange River,
invade the OFS, capture that republic’s capital (Bloemfontein), and advance further north-
wards, all along the main railway line, to Johannesburg, and then to Pretoria (the Transvaal’s
capital). As far as the Boers’ strategic planning (or lack of it) was concerned: they were
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4 A. Wessels, “Afrikaners at war” in J. Gooch (ed.), The Boer War: direction, experience and image (london,
2000), pp. 83-84.
5 To gain an understanding of how the British in particular involved the civilian population and black people
almost from the start of the war, see, for example, S.B. Spies, Methods of barbarism? Roberts and Kitchener
and civilians in the Boer republics, January 1900 - May 1902 (Cape Town, 1977) and P. Warwick, Black
people and the South African War, 1899-1902 (Cambridge, 1983).
6 Report of His Majesty’s commissioners appointed to inquire into the military preparations and other matters
connected with the war in South Africa (Cd. 1789, London, 1903), pp. 21, 34.
7 J.F. Maurice (ed.), History of the war in South Africa 1899-1902 1 (London, 1906), p. 2.
8 L.S Amery (ed.), The Times history of the war in South Africa 1899-1902 2 (London, 1902), p. 72; H.C.
Hillegas, With the Boer forces (London, 1900), pp. 93-94; J.H. Breytenbach, Die Geskiedenis van die Twee-
de Vryheidsoorlog in Suid-Afrika, 1899-1902 1 (Pretoria, 1969), pp. 52-60, 85-97; D.J. Haupt, Die Staatsar-
tillerie van die Suid-Afrikaanse Republiek (M.A., University of Pretoria, (1947), passim.
9 As far as the initial British strategic planning is concerned, see Wessels, Die Britse militêre strategie, pp.
257-315.