Page 313 - General Giuseppe GARIBALDI - english version

THE 1867 CAMPAIGN 295

more or less the same characteristics as that on the left, but, politically speak-
ing, the situation would have been very different for Garibaldi depending on
whether he stopped in the Viterbo area or on the left of the river. In the first
case, he would have a border at the rear that, being shorter and near Florence
is well guarded by the troops gathered by Ricotti, there would no hope of get-
ting help or supplies, in the second case, the Hero, closer to the south, where
the glory of his legendary conquest was still high in the reverence of the pop-
ulation, he could still count on circumstances favourable to the venture.
These could be the reasons for choosing Tivoli over Viterbo.

THE OFFENSIVE OF THE FRENCH-PAPAL ARMY

On the evening of the 1 November a council of war took place in Rome
chaired by Kanzler.
The opinion of the latter, to launch an immediate offensive, prevails on
that of de Failly, who wants to wait for the arrival of the 2 nd Division, and
decides to attack Garibaldi immediately at Monterotondo so that he will not
have a chance of getting reinforcement and to concentrate more forces.
The French will take part in the operation.
Although from the report of Kanzler it can be deduced that he knew or at
least he could foresee Garibaldi’s intention to move to Tivoli, the allies
believed that they would find the enemy still in position at Monterotondo
“in a military camp, waiting for an attack”.
As Garibaldi’s decision responds to a clear and objective examination of the
situation, and it results in a logical concept of operations, from the enemy’s
side one can also understand the necessity for strong action that would put a
decisive stop the unrest, resolve a situation that if left unchecked could pres-
ent dangers but which, given the superiority of forces, could be dealt with
now. It was convenient to attack Garibaldi in Monterotondo, with his rear to
the border, separated from his wing Divisions, with the logistic difficulties he
now found himself in, instead of giving him a chance to amend to the low
morale and material consequences of the retreat, to get reinforcements and
gather all his forces in Tivoli in better defensive conditions, with more space
behind him and in more favourable condition to move in any direction.
These were rational strategies on the part of both adversaries.
However, the execution by the Garibaldians was slow, slowed down and