Page 314 - General Giuseppe GARIBALDI - english version

296 GENERAL GIUSEPPE GARIBALDI

hampered by the difficulties of a more than imperfect organisation, by diffi-
cult logistics, by the inability of some officers and the jealousies of distant
leaders, reluctant to follow orders of convergence to avoid losing their rela-
tive independence.
These are known and recurrent faults of irregular troops that are not
cemented by adequate training and not amalgamated by a substantial and
formal firm discipline, faults that not even the high sentiments that animate
the best of them, the genius, the energy and the prestige of someone like
Garibaldi can completely remedy, particularly after a setback such as the
retreat from the Aniene.
On the other hand, well organised and disciplined troops, although
maybe composed of followers of less individual valour, and certainly in our
case not of equal virtue in terms of higher command, manage to got the bet-
ter of enthusiasms, of personal qualities, of geniality of behaviour and of
unquestioned prestige of the leader, because such virtues do not manage to
bring about that strict discipline needed to unite leaders and subordinates
into a single body of obedient intelligence and hearts to reach the goal.

THE DAYOF MENTANA

In the afternoon of 2 nd November Garibaldi went beyond Mentana to visit
the positions occupied by the Paggi column and to do a reconnaissance on the
road to Tivoli and it appears that he went up to the Gentile Mountain on the
Nomentana; then up to Vigna Santucci, then back to Monterotondo, and in
the evening gave orders for the march that was to take place in the early hours
rd
of the 3 . The departure had been verbally fixed for 04:30: that is before dawn.
At 01:00 of the 3 rd a buttero (a cowherd from the Maremma) arrived in
Rome, with a dispatch from Cucchi with a report on the council of war that
st
took place in Rome on the evening of the 1 November.
It was wonderfully precise: it indicated the departure time of the troops, the
marching order (Papal troops on the vanguard, the French at the end), and
plans about the offensive, in this way the news about a close enemy’s offensive
arrived at the Garibaldian camp on the afternoon of the 2, was confirmed.
Garibaldi cannot believe that the French could march against him and sends
the news to Menotti with no added comment, in fact he gives in to the demands
of his son and unfortunately authorizes him to delay the departure that should