Page 318 - General Giuseppe GARIBALDI - english version
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300 GENERAL GIUSEPPE GARIBALDI
1 detachment of the Engineers Corps;
1 Ambulance Division.
Total: about 2,000 men.
General total: about 5,000 men, 150 horses, 10 pieces.
However, some reservations about these official numbers are necessary; there
is too much discrepancy between those numbers and the organic strength of
the divisions, and the often differing number indicated in the various reports;
it is very likely that they were skilfully altered for easily understandable reasons.
It can be said that the strength of allies that were in fact present was largely
superior to the one indicated namely about 3,500 Papal and 3,000 French, in
total about 6,500 men.
The troops destined for the operation will gather in the courtyard of the
Macao barracks, and then coming out of Porta Pia, through the Nomentana
road, will march to Monterotondo, where the enemy will be met, attacked and
pushed back on the border of Passo Corese or against the Tiber.
The march is slow and delayed by some drawbacks, at 10:00 a stop at the
Capobianco homestead to attend the Mass celebrated by military chaplain P.
Ligiez in the rural little chapel there. The rainy weather in the morning
improved and the sky is clear. The de Polhés column has closed on the De
Courten column; at 11:00 the march resumes towards Mentana at normal
speed because at 12:30-12:45, the vanguard bumps into the Garibaldians near
the Romitorio at about 6 km from Capobianco.
Following orders previously given by Garibaldi, the II battalion (Ciotti) of
the 1 st column (Salomone) was in outposts at Mentana since the 30 th
st
October; the Paggi column on the 1 November occupied S. Angelo Romano
with the XVI battalion (Buzzi), Montecelio with the XV (Vannutelli) and with
the XVII (Rambosio) was supposed to occupy the high ground between the
Nomentana and the ancient road of Tivoli, that is, the Monte d’Oro (Gold
Mountain) and Monte del Soldato (Soldier Mountain).
The commander of the II battalion received precise orders to “double night
surveillance and intensify patrol reconnaissance”. Major Ciotti was not very
precise in carrying out this surveillance order.
If the Ciotti and the Rambosio had done their duty, Monte Palombino,
Monte d’Oro and Monte del Soldato and the surrounding high grounds should
have been occupied or at least guarded, and then there would have been no sur-
prises during the march, and if they had got some reinforcements, they could

