Page 351 - General Giuseppe GARIBALDI - english version

THE FRENCH CAMPAIGN 1870 - 1871 333

The occupation of Dijon warned the French command about the proba-
ble subsequent advance of the Prussians on Lyon via the valley of the Saône.
th
But this was not Moltke’s intention, who, on the 29 , after the surrender of
Metz on October 27, had assigned to the XIV st Army Corps a new mission:
st
Werder, strengthened with the 1 and 4 th Division of the reserves had to
besiege Belfort and cover that siege; watch and immobilize the relevant
enemy’s forces that were reported gathering in Besançon and south of Dijon
and from the Ognon, while keeping the centre of gravity of his forces in
Vesoul.
th
As a consequence of the above mentioned instructions, on the 30 , after
leaving two Baden brigades in Dijon, Werder began to move back to Vesoul
where he arrived on November 2, after leaving detachments in Gray and
Pontailler, with the task of maintaining contact with the French troops in
Auxonnes and the Army of the Vosges in Dôle.
Considered the huge tasks entrusted to Werder, the XIV st Corps was
deployed in a thin line from Dijon to Vesoul and forces that were three times
as numerous, although qualitatively unequal opposed it. An aggressive
demeanour of the French in that moment and before the two Division
reached Werder, would have certainly created difficulties to him and obtained
great advantages. It seems that General Crouzat had exactly that intention. He
had proposed to Gambetta, and the latter had approved it, an offensive action
against the Prussian detachment in Gray on November 4, but soon he had to
abstain from the idea and move from the offensive idea to that of a passive
defence, and even ordered to destroy the bridges on the Doubs, an order that
was not carried out due to Garibaldi’s strong and correct intervention.
He, as for him, with only his forces, still under organisation – all kinds of
disparate elements continued to flock in, including the famous Breton legion
that did not want to serve under the general’s orders, as soon as a group of
about 800 men of the 4 th Brigade was formed and had received a mountain
Battery, in the extreme lack of equipment, including overcoats, weapons and
means of transport – could set for himself the goal of attacking Werder, and
even the goal of stopping his advance southward. Garibaldi could just con-
tinue with his tactics of molestation, take by surprise the enemy’s parties by
setting up ambushes to prevent their scouting and requisitions, impress his
adversary by carrying out small surprise actions and keep him uncertain
about the real amount of the French forces active in the Côte-d’Or and south
of the Ognon. The detachments sent by Garibaldi across the Saône served