Page 352 - General Giuseppe GARIBALDI - english version

334 GENERAL GIUSEPPE GARIBALDI

very well this purpose and their action, eminently quick and aggressive,
stopped the enemy’s activity and prevented him from any attempt of advance
along the valley of the Saône.
The surrender of Metz, however, radically changed the situation. The two
Prussian Armies engaged in that siege were now available and everything fore-
told, on the one hand, the starting of vigorous operations in the west and, on
the other hand, a very important change in the conduct of operations in the
east; certainly also in that theatre the Prussians would have taken the offen-
sive.
And so it was. Werder, although watching Besançon, was now in the con-
dition of leading an offensive on Lyon via the valley of the Saône – an oper-
ation that would isolate the stronghold of Besançon from central France –
and had the possibility to defeat the new French formations deployed in the
region. Werder, who had exactly that intention, started a series of reconnais-
sance tours against those troops to assess their force and their deployment.
The detachment sent on November 5 from Dijon and Gray met the
Garibaldian troops southward, in Saint-Jean-de-Losne and Genlis. These lat-
ter did not hesitate to bravely attack the Baden troops and force them to
withdraw and take important defensive measures in fear of a full offensive.
These events and the news that reported the presence of other French troops
more westward, towards Beaune and Chagny, made Werder decide to launch
a vigorous attack on Dôle. The main body of the XIV th Corps, consequent-
ly, moved from Vesoul towards Pesmes and Dijon; but it did not come in
contact with the Army of the Vosges; on the contrary, it came to know with
great surprise that between Dôle and Besançon there were no troops and
Dôle was clear.
The Delegation of Tours, in the light of the presence of 30.000 Prussians
on the Saône and 50.000 in Alsace, had in fact decided to give up any idea
about an offensive north of the Ognon. Michel, who now commanded in
Besançon, deemed even necessary to abandon that stronghold and withdraw
his troops south of the Doubs, a retreat that would have assured communi-
cations with Lyon and the possibility to manoeuvre on the enemy’s flank if
the enemy had advanced in the valley of the Saône or in the Morvan and
headed for that city. Gambetta approved this proposal and ordered Garibaldi
to leave Dôle and go to Autun; he informed him that a division with 10.000
men and 18 pieces under the lead of General Bonnet would be formed in
Chagny, a point that the Delegation correctly considered of a high impor-