Page 353 - General Giuseppe GARIBALDI - english version

THE FRENCH CAMPAIGN 1870 - 1871 335

tance and that had to be defended by the troops of Besançon supported by
the Army of the Vosges.
Gambetta and Frecynet’s idea was to entrust Garibaldi and Bonnet the
task of defending the Marvan and the industrial basin of Creusot lying
behind it; covering Nevers and therefore covering indirectly also the line of
the Loire; Michel’s troops had to support them, but at the same time they had
to continue to watch over the road to Lyon. This plan, however, was not
implemented since the information that the Delegation received in those
days and that reported the march of Metz’ Armies westward pushed it to
strengthen the Armies operating on the Loire. In consequence, Michel’s
forces and the Bonnet Division were transported westward by train, and the
mobilisés of the Jura and the Rhône had to watch over the Doubs and the
Côte-d’Or and the defence of the valley of the Ouche was given to the Army
of the Vosges. On November 11, Garibaldi went to Autun. He had about
st
6000 men (1 and 2 nd brigades); of them, the best elements were pushed
forward to Bligny and Sombernon; the 4 th brigade, Ricciotti’s, although
formed by just 800 men, was sent to Château-Chinon with the order of car-
rying out forays towards Saulieu, Montbard and Châtillon-sur-Seine.

The Garibaldian manoeuvre of Dijon. - Garibaldi’s thoughts, however, were
focused on a more important goal.
As soon as he arrived in Autun, although understanding the difficulty and
importance of the mission entrusted to him, he thought indispensable to cap-
ture Dijon from the enemy. The undertaking was not simple, but Garibaldi
was undaunted by difficulties.
He could not understand any other way of waging war if not his greatest
dynamism, and his ability in obtaining the maximum exploitation of his
means and in multiplying their efficiency was rare to the point of being
unique. No other commander would have been able to handle a fight tool
such as the one he had available in many of his campaigns: in general, always
quantitatively outnumbered by the enemy’s forces he had to fight often
equipped with the bare minimum, always lacking training, and with an
improvised organization and provenance of its components.
Garibaldi was a broad-minded commander, but had a simple and straight-
forward thinking, was able of hazardous undertakings that sometimes could
seem reckless. He was unparalleled in distributing his forces, and, not restrict-
ed by a rigid symmetric organisation, he obtained a moral and material selec-