Page 358 - General Giuseppe GARIBALDI - english version

340 GENERAL GIUSEPPE GARIBALDI

naissance patrols had been sent by Werder toward Nuits, south of Dijon, to
watch the French Crémer Division deployed in Beaune. Westwards, in the
valley of the Ouche, the Baden outposts stretched along the Plombières-
Prenois-Darois line; Werder was far from thinking that Garibaldi could have
offensive ambitions. He therefore was fully surprised when, at dawn of the
th
25 , his outposts were attacked in Plombières. Garibaldi, having left the still
unorganised mobilisés with Lobbia in Autun, about 7000 men, on the 21 st
moved towards Arnay-le-Duc, Bligny and the valley of the Ouche, with the
Genoese Carabinieri, Tanara’s Italian legion, two Batteries, the Battalions of
the mobile national guards of the 3 rd Brigade and the Engineers Auxiliary
st
th
Company, a total of about 2900 men. In the afternoon of the 24 , the 1 ,
2 nd and 3 rd Brigades had to converge to Pont-de-Pany, whereas the 4 th had
th
to go to Arnay; in reality, this manoeuvre took place on the 25 .
It was the General’s intention to head for Dijon with two columns in the
st
night: one column, on the right, formed by the 1 Brigade, along the car-
riageway running along the right bank of the Ouche and bordered in the
south by groups of snipers, had to go to the town of Ouche; the other – the
3 rd Brigade of Menotti - by train, along a railway bordered on its north side,
in the direction of Lantenay, by the best troops of the 2 nd Delpech, had as
th
its goal the railway station of Dijon. In the afternoon of the 25 , Bosak
clashed with the enemy’s outposts near Velars and was stopped. The surprise
was no longer possible. And then Garibaldi modified his directions and sent
the entire right column from Mâlain to Lantenay, where the general spent the
nigh, during which the Chief of Staff of the Crémer Division joined him and
informed him that before the 29 th his division could not join in the action
on Dijon from the south. Either to give up this undertaking, that had
become uncertain without Crémer’s aid, or to wait. Garibaldi chose to wait;
he remained in Lantenay and sent his scouts towards Val-Suzon to see
whether there were signs of the enemy in that direction dangerous for him.
th
But at about 6.30 of the following morning, the 26 , the scouts report-
ed the approaching of a strong enemy column from Prenois to Pasques: it was
the Degenfeld detachment of the 4 th Division of the reserves sent from
Mirebeau towards St.-Seine on a reconnaissance mission (3 Battalions, 1
squadron and a half and 1 Battery).

Battle of Pasques. – The surprise attack on Dijon had therefore been trans-
formed into the battle of Pasques.