Page 362 - General Giuseppe GARIBALDI - english version

344 GENERAL GIUSEPPE GARIBALDI

in that moment had the remarkable result of forcing Werder to take up the
defensive and to give up the offensive he had prepared and he wanted to
launch on Lyon. From a moral point of view, then, the attack on Dijon
forced both Werder and the German Supreme Command to a greater con-
sideration of the Army of the Vosges and induced them to increase the forces
destined to communication security.
And not only that: Garibaldi’s offensive revealed to Gambetta and
Freycinet the usefulness and the advantages of an action against the German
rearguards operating in the east. It is therefore right to say that in this offen-
sive we must find the seed of the Bourbaki’s expedition and the shattering of
the illusion that Paris could be freed only by an action from the west. The idea
of acting on the Prussian rearguards from the east came out in those days and,
once again, Garibaldi’s authoritative agreement, as we will say, supported it.

The battle of Nuits. – The Army of the Vosges, after the action of
November 26, was reorganized and completed in Autun, although with trou-
ble and among any kind of difficulties. Garibaldi, confronted with the very
poor conditions of his troops and the slowness of governmental provisions,
sent his agents to the provinces to buy up weapons and items of clothing,
while ordering to carry out fortification work around Autun to protect it
against a sudden and foreseeable attack of the enemy.
Until December 18, this reorganisation and rearrangement was not inter-
rupted by military operations. In the meantime, agreements had been
th
reached among Garibaldi, Crémer, Bressolles and Pellissier and on the 12 ,
in Chalon, the four generals had met to prepare an action plan, but nothing
was concluded because the French general wanted to repeat the attack on
Dijon with the concourse of all their forces that had to concentrate there.
Garibaldi expressed exactly the opposite opinion, because the enemy could
now be surprised with difficulty and also because the fighting qualities of the
mobilisés, who formed the 4/5 of their army could not be trusted and the past
experience had shown exactly that; and also because an open battle against
Werder’s forces now gathered and increased in number by the arrival of new
units and largely provided with artillery was to be considered as impossible.
The Army of the Vosges, however, was still being organized and only 1200
st
men could be fully used for the 1 Brigade, 1500 for the 2 nd Brigade, 2800
th
for the 3 rd and 2500 for the 4 . The artillery, formed by elements that had
never fired, consisted of two 4-pounder field Batteries and one mountain