Page 366 - General Giuseppe GARIBALDI - english version

348 GENERAL GIUSEPPE GARIBALDI

tions. Therefore the preliminary occupation of Dijon and the march north
would have been excluded and replaced by a manoeuvre along an oblique line
in the northeast for about 100 kilometres, that foresaw in its course the lib-
eration of Belfort; this idea was totally different from that of Freycinet’s plan
and from Garibaldi’s one.
However, having reached agreements with Bourbaki, the plan was execut-
ed, but the landing place was moved from Beaune to Chagny and Chalon,
since the latter, after the battle of Nuits, was uncovered and exposed to
Werder’s attacks.
Who had to be the commander-in-chief of all those forces operating in the
same theatre and aiming at a single objective?
This issue, which in definitive was the main one for the good success of
the operation, very risky indeed, and not clearly precised in its developments
and conduct, was not solved and could not have been solved.
Put aside the idea to give the command-in-chief of the operations to
Garibaldi, a compromise was achieved, based of course on an ambiguous
decision, well and shamelessly handled by de Serres, Freycinet’s deus ex machi-
na: the two Army Corps would be under the lead of Borubaki; Garibaldi
would keep his independence, but would be requested to agree with
Bourbaki’s proposals and cooperate with him. As for Crémer’s Division and
the other troops of Besançon and Lyon, nothing precise was established: at
first they remained independent, then Crémer passed under Bourbaki’s
orders, the others under Bressolles’. With such a devised unity of command,
nothing good could be expected and if we add the intrusive interference of
Freycinet and his representative de Serres, not always in agreement with his
boss, as well as the hot-tempered spites of the easily offended Bordone, it will
be clear that such an already badly equipped boat could not sail among the
tempests of a situation that was in itself critical and full of dangers.
In such a jumble of mean personal competitions, frivolous feelings of pro-
fessional or national pride, so much in contrast with the seriousness of the
moment in which the already too much compromised destiny of France had
to be decided, it is right to stress that Giuseppe Garibaldi gave an example of
generous unselfishness. The Knight of the Ideal, repeatedly declared to be ready
to serve under any commander provided the unity of command was assured!
But other circumstances made the good success of the operation uncer-
tain; the insufficient precautionary measures adopted to maintain the secre-