Page 370 - General Giuseppe GARIBALDI - english version

352 GENERAL GIUSEPPE GARIBALDI

The occupation of Courson and the subsequent occupation of Avallon
drew the attention of the Prussian command to the need to clarify the situa-
tion and increase the troops tasked with the protection behind the lines,
before moving the VII th Corps to the Saône, and Moltke informed Zastrow,
who was moving as ordered towards Châtillon-sur-Seine, about the presence
of numerous French troops in Avallon and in Clamecy; on the 30 th he
ordered him to suspend his march and stop on the Armançon in observation.
That day Ricciotti reached Vermenton and his forward posts got in con-
tact with the troops of the VII th Corps all along the front of the 13 th
Division, south of Auxerre, and reported columns in movement towards
south-east along the Montbard road and north of it: it was the 14 th Division.
To avoid being cut off from Autun, Ricciotti withdrew to Avallon and
remained there until January 3, watching the enemy, who was stopped, too.
Then the 4 th Brigade advanced to Saulieu, got in contact with the 2 nd gar-
th
risoned in Vitteaux, then went north and reached Semur on the 5 , where
they remained, in close contact with the VII th Corps, that had sent detach-
ments south and south-east, to Vitteaux and St. Seine. The 2 nd Brigade left
Vitteaux, but forced the Prussians to withdraw from Chanceau, north –west
of Saint-Seine.
The activity of the Army of the Vosges had clarified the situation: no
doubts remained that large Prussian troops coming from the west wanted to
move towards the Saône, to strengthen the XIV th Corps. Werder, in fact, was
worried about the concentration of French troops on the Doubs, but did not
yet have the feeling that those troops where Bourbaki’s army, and, convinced
that the French’s objective was Belfort, he had suspended the implementation
of Moltke’s order to get closer to the VII th Corps and had on the contrary
moved eastward, in Vesul, stretching his front for about 70 kilometres, up to
Delle.
Freycinet therefore had precise elements to exploit at his convenience the
favourable situation produced in the eastern theatre; a strong a quick action
of Borubaki against Werder’s forces, alone and unable to receive prompt sup-
port, for the distance at which the VII th Corps still was, promised a positive
outcome.
In case that action could not be carried out, because the Army was not yet
ready to act, the situation on the Armançon requested beyond all doubts that
the advance of those enemy troops be stopped at all costs and counterbal-