Page 372 - General Giuseppe GARIBALDI - english version

354 GENERAL GIUSEPPE GARIBALDI

Bosak, Ricciotti and Lobbia all along the front from Avallon to Châtillon
kept him in that situation of uncertainty that had de facto determined his
temporary halting and had also led Moltke to think that such an activity, car-
ried out along such a large front and at such a huge distance from the Saône
was the covering for the expected probable new offensive of the western Army
on Paris, and not just a troubling action.
This situation created by the action of the Army of the Vosges did not
admit any delay if the outcome of the operations in the east had not to be
jeopardised: a rapid action was needed against Werder’s 25.000 men scattered
in a cordon and, as we said, in the region of Dijon-Langres a suitable amount
of forces – XV th Corps, Army of the Vosges, Crémer Division – had to be
established to face the new troops coming from the west and avoid that they
could jeopardize the outcome of Bourbaki’s manoeuvre.
On the contrary, nothing was done, and, even worse than that, Bourbaki
remained inactive awaiting the XV th Corps; he even started to admit that
marching north to find the XIV th Corps and attack it was useless. Stationed
in Belfort, instead of the real main objective of the operation – to cut off the
communications of the Prussian armies with the Rhine - Bourbaki believed
he just had to interpose his Army between Vesoul and Belfort, and was con-
vinced that such a manoeuvre could force Werder to leave Vesul in the fear
of loosing his communications with Belfort. In short, Bourbaki did not want
to attack; but, perhaps, he wanted to be attacked, and, convinced as all his
French colleagues of 1870 of the superiority of a defensive action over an
active one, he remained on the defensive and, in so doing, he thought he
would achieve the final victory.
«J’ai fait tomber Dijon (sic!) sans combat, Gray sans combat. Je ferai tomber
Vesoul sans combat, Lure pareillement, puis Héricourt et nous arriverons ainsi à
Belfort qui tombera de la même façon...!». And informed Freycinet that he
would march on Villersexel, between Doubs and Ognon, and the minister,
although reluctantly, approved.
Such a situation, so favourable for the French could not continue for long.
st
Moltke, although not completely sure that the 1 French Army was moving
towards the Saône, urged Werder to clarify the situation south of the Ognon
and attack the forces of his adversary; the small actions among the
Garibaldians and the detachments covering the VII th Corps that occurred in
those days and the action near Saulieu that occurred on the 5 th with
Menotti’s snipers, began to appear for what they really were and Moltke