Page 376 - General Giuseppe GARIBALDI - english version

358 GENERAL GIUSEPPE GARIBALDI

about to seize him, had headed for Flavigny, from where, after warning
Lobbia of the danger he would run if he had continued his march on
Langres, marched north again on January 11 to assess the situation of the
enemy’s troops reported around Châtillon.
Via Baigneux, where he engaged a lucky action against an enemy detach-
ment that he forced to withdraw and leave in his hands 12 prisoners, and via
Aignay-le-Duc, Ricciotti had bravely covered the entire front of Manteuffel,
in contact with him, and precisely assessing his forces and their deployment.
The 4 th Brigade, tired from the long run, needed to get reorganised; it was
also necessary to report in detail the situation to Garibaldi as soon as possi-
ble; and therefore Ricciotti headed southward via Avot and Is-sur-Tille and
th
returned to Dijon on the 15 .
In the meantime, Manteuffel advanced towards the Saóne, northwest of
Dijon, right against the main body of the enemy’s troops: on the right (south)
th
the IInd Corps, on the left (north) the VII . The troops coming from
Dijon, to protect the right flank of the IInd Corps, were entrusted to Kettler
and to von Dannenberg’s detachment, and it was against the latter that
Ricciotti had fought in Champd’Oiseau and Baigneux, whereas von Kettler’s
Brigade, in echelon formation behind it, covered the Châtillon-Tonnerre
communication line. As the column approached the Saône, it became neces-
sary to increase the security on the right flank against possible attack of the
Army of the Vosges and, in fact, on January 18, an entire Division was tasked
with this mission: half of the 4 th Division in Til-Châtel and Dannenberg’s
Brigade in Fontaine-Française; in the meantime, von Kettler had reached
Montbard.
It was indeed on that day that Manteuffel received the first news about
Werder’s victory on the Lisaine and the news that Bourbaki had begun to
withdraw. The general situation in the east had been radically modified by
these events and Manteuffel, by an extremely risky plan, decided to stop the
march on Vesoul and to turn right to rush to Bourbaki’s communication lines
following the Saône below Besançon, a manoeuvre that would have forced
the French general to head for the difficult and impassable region of the Jura.
In fact, in the days of January 11, 12 and 13, Werder, had organised the
position he had occupied on the Lisaine; attacked by the entire French Army
on January 15, 16 and 17 between Montbéliard and Héricourt, he had resis-
ted the repeated attacks of Bourbaki’s overwhelming forces, with and
admirable obstinacy and unswerving faith in his victory, and had neutralized