Page 371 - General Giuseppe GARIBALDI - english version

THE FRENCH CAMPAIGN 1870 - 1871 353

anced with adequate forces, which, of course, could not be the case of the
forces available to Garibaldi, Crémer, Pellissier and Bressolles.
The French had also the XV th Army Corps, formerly in Bourbaki’s Army
that had been left in Bourges. This Corps, together with the above mentioned
troops, had to be entrusted with the covering of Bourbaki’s flank and back on
the right bank of the Saône, and had to manoeuvre supported by the strong-
holds of Dijon and Langres.
Bourbaki, who had never given news of his situation to Garibaldi, nor had
requested news on the actions of the Army of the Vosges, for him so impor-
tant, on January 2, urged Freycinet to send the XV th Corps. De Serres, who
was well informed of the situation, had, on the contrary, requested the min-
ister to immediately sent to Dijon a Brigade of that Corps to support
Garibaldi and informed of this Bourbaki, who agreed, although reluctantly,
with de Serres’ decision, but insisted that the rest of the XV th Army Corps
had to be sent to Besançon. Nothing was done about that.
Also the rulers of Bordeaux, like Bourbaki, with an astonishing underesti-
mation of the reality, believed that Pellissier’s 7000 mobilisés armed with per-
cussion guns and their likewise counterparts in the Army of the Vosges were
sufficient to defend Dijon and cover Bourbaki’s back and that the 5-600
snipers and Italian volunteers of that same Army deployed in a thin line from
Avallon to Saint-Seine, could resist, although with the support of the already
defeated Crémer, the attack of the VII th Prussian Army Corps and the other
troops that were likely to march in its support.
The telegram of January 2 to Garibaldi still in Autun: «the commander-
in-chief counts on all your forces to be tomorrow between the enemy and
Dijon» and the subsequent one of Freycinet to Bordone: «you do not have
anything else to do that to set out for Dijon and attack the approaching
enemy on his flank», do not leave any doubt on this matter. Apart the con-
sideration that the enemy could not have Dijon as its target, but wanted to
reunite with the XIV th Corps via the most direct route, which excluded that
city, it remains still difficult to understand how Garibaldi, with his forces
alone, could have attacked on the flank the VII th Corps positioned between
Auxerre and Châtillon. He could do no more than what he had been effec-
tively doing for 10 days: watch over the enemy, and trouble him so to oblige
him to scatter his forces, In fact, Zastrow had been forced to cover his troops
with seven strong detachments along a front of 40 km. The bold forays of