Page 375 - General Giuseppe GARIBALDI - english version

THE FRENCH CAMPAIGN 1870 - 1871 357

acknowledge the situation of the French, and when, on January 8, he was
sure that they could difficulty make it to Belfort before him, instead of accel-
erating his movements, with an admirable clarity of ideas, decided to attack
Bourbaki on his right flank to play for more time to his advantage and the
advantage of Manteuffel’s Army, that Moltke had reported as marching east-
ward. He ordered the 4 th Division of the reserves to attack the French in
th
Villersexel on the 9 .
This unexpected reaction fully achieved the result that Werder wanted;
although the Baden troops at the end of the day that initially had been
favourable to them had to leave the positions conquered when confronted
with the overwhelming forces of the French XVIIIth Corps. The action of
Villersexel stopped Bourbaki’s army and forced him to modify once again his
operative plan, and to deploy all his Army on Villersexel to fight that defen-
sive battle that Bourbaki so much desired. Until January 13, the Army await-
ed that battle and lost three days, three precious days for the French, thus
preparing its ruin.
Manteuffel was approaching; the day of the battle of Villersexel he was
already one marching stage beyond Auxerre; Werder, in the meantime, had
quickly escaped the clash with Bourbaki and on the 11 th had reached the
Lisaine and interposed his troops between the latter and Belfort, with his
flanks covered by Willisen and Bredow.
Bourbaki, since Werder did not attack, decided on the 13 th to resume his
march on Arcey; where he met Bredow.
Bourbaki did not know anything about Manteuffel’s advance towards the
Saône, nor did he care to know something, since he never tried to commu-
nicate with Garibaldi, who had remained alone in Dijon to face the power-
ful southern Army. The latter, on January 13, definitely took the direction of
Vesoul and did not consider, as it was but logical, Dijon, on which a simple
watch was sufficient.
Against the Army of the Vosges, it was sufficient to use some detachments
and Manteuffel gave that tasks to the von Kettler Brigade of the II nd Corps,
with 6 Battalions, 2 Squadrons and 2 Batteries, that initially had to deploy in
Nuits and then had to flank the Army on the right and advance on
Sombernon, Saint-Seine, Til-Châtel.
Garibaldi was perfectly informed of the situation through the precise news
that Ricciotti and Lobbia had sent him.
Ricciotti, after the event of Montbard, escaped from the grip that was