Page 374 - General Giuseppe GARIBALDI - english version

356 GENERAL GIUSEPPE GARIBALDI

the general and the two soldiers embraced each other in silence.
With the progressing of the Prussian advance on the Saône, the field of
action of the snipers was more and more limited and guerrilla warfare was no
longer possible.
«The Garibaldian brigades, after keeping contact with Manteuffel’s Army
for some more days, around January 12, went to Dijon, where since the 6 th
Garibaldi had taken position with the mobilisés.
Only Lobbia was not able to reach that stronghold, since he had been cut
off while launching a foray on Langres and was forced to take shelter in that
fortress, where he remained till the end of the war.

Bourbaki’s manoeuvre. – Which was, in the meantime, the situation on the
front of Bourbaki’s Army?
Werder, after the surprising news that north of the Doubs impressive
French troops were stopped, on January 6 started to withdraw, following the
new directives received by Moltke, who had ordered him to cover at all costs
the siege of Belfort, and on the evening of the 8 th he positioned the main
body of his troops around Vesoul. Informed that the French were at
Villersexel, he immediately ordered his troops to march on Lure and inter-
pose themselves between the enemy and Belfort.
Considering Bourbaki’s poor activities, this march did not create any dan-
ger.
th
He, on the 6 , had abandoned the route to Vesoul and headed east
towards Villersexel, deviating of a few kilometres; on the 7 th he had stopped
to wait for the XV th Corps to land; and he had not ordered his troops to
march faster the following day, a day that the Army spent completely motion-
less. The orders for the 9 th foresaw a movement of the different Corps of
about 10 kilometres: part of the XVIII th Corps had to occupy Villersexel.
With this action, Bourbaki seemed not to worry about the threat looming up
on his communications, nor did he worry about the likeliness that the enemy
forces reported west of the Saône could in the meantime reach and strength-
en Werder.
To him, Garibaldi’s troops in Dijon were more than sufficient to face this
matter and he even thought as unnecessary Crémer’s presence in that strong-
hold, therefore he had called him to Gray.
However, the inexplicable slowness of his movements gave Werder the
possibility to carry out a counter-manoeuvre. He, in fact, had all the time to