Page 369 - General Giuseppe GARIBALDI - english version

THE FRENCH CAMPAIGN 1870 - 1871 351

reinforce him, already reported in Tonnerre. Very little was known of the lat-
ter’s movements; in fact Gambetta believed it unlikely that he was marching
on Dijon to support the XIV th Corps.
From the enemy’s side, until December 26, as we said, Moltke had
thought that the French wanted to try an offensive on Paris with the Army
from Montargis on Fontainebleau, although he had been informed of impor-
tant railways movements in the basin of the Saône and from Lyon in the
direction of Besançon, but he believed that these were mobilisés coming from
the south, perhaps directed to Belfort. Moltke began to doubt something in
the subsequent days, but his doubts soon disappeared after the reassuring
news sent by Werder and, most of all, after the events that were taking place
on the front of the VII th Corps in the region of Auxerre - Châtillon-sur-
Seine, events that concerned the Army of the Vosges.
To carry out the task he had been given by Freycinet, Garibaldi, as it was
his habit, did not want to remain passive and wait for the enemy to show up
before to start his action; he wanted to get in contact with him, watch over his
moves to understand his intentions and possibly trouble him with unexpect-
ed and risky forays against his communications. Such a mission, to be per-
formed a few hundred kilometres from Autun, and requiring boldness, spirit
of initiative and resistance of the troops to very harsh weather conditions –
temperatures in those days had dropped to 18 degrees below zero – could not
be carried out in mass or be entrusted to the mobilisés, mostly still without
overcoats and who did not have any spirit or military qualities; it had to be
entrusted to loyal elements, to the snipers and the Italian volunteers. Excluded
the mobilisés from the Brigades, the rest led by Bosak, Lobbia – who had
replaced Delpech - Menotti and Ricciotti, he formed many mobile detach-
ments that spread out in the west and north-west surroundings of Autun.
Garibaldi gave the riskiest task to Ricciotti, who had to advance as far as
Auxerre and Tonnerre; he sent Lobbia to Langres; Bosak to Semur; Menotti
remained to cover the base of Autun.
Ricciotti left on December 23 with 1200 men and on the evening of that
same day reached Château-Chinon after a difficult march in the blizzard that
immobilized him in that place for two days. On the 26 th he moved to
Clamecy, but, informed that the Prussians were marching on Courson, he
th
rushed there on the 27 ; only a skirmish took place there with half cavalry
squadron of the VII th Corps, who withdrew.