Page 368 - General Giuseppe GARIBALDI - english version

350 GENERAL GIUSEPPE GARIBALDI

As the space of manoeuvre was reduced, due to the advance eastward of
the Prussian army, the Army of the Vosges and the other irregular units, not
being able to withstand it, would have ended up in the situation of either
leaving the front or finding the support of a stronghold: the task of support-
ing Bourbaki would have been ineffective, and, what is most, precarious and
limited in time.
From what above, we clearly see the series of mistakes made since the very
beginning by the war leaders in conceiving and implementing that manoeu-
vre in the east. The idea that inspired and mapped out its basic lines was very
good indeed; but at war ideas are worth if they are well implemented; as
Napoleon said, the art of war is the art of carrying out actions, and in this
case we cannot say that the rationality of this idea was followed by the ration-
ality of its implementation. And therefore its outcome had to be expected,
and it was the battle of the Lisaine, with the tragic flight of the unlucky Army
into Switzerland. It is useful to report that Garibaldi, once informed of the
final solution adopted, so different from the one he had proposed, and hav-
ing realised its irrationality, bitterly condemned it. His opinion was con-
firmed by the facts.
Since it is not our intention to narrate the events of Bourbaki’s Army, but
only those concerning the Army of the Vosges, we will discuss the manoeu-
vre of the Lisaine just for what could be sufficient to understand Garibaldi’s
action and to stress the aid that he was able to give to Bourbaki’s army, with-
in the limits of his operative possibilities and the directives received by
Gambetta and Freycinet.

The covering action of the Army of the Vosges. - The eastern Army formed
by the XVIII th and XX th Army Corps was transported by train from the west
to Dôle and Besançon amid all kinds of difficulties due to a deficient railway
organization. Transports started on December 22.
Of the elements destined to the covering during the movement, the
Crémer Division was in Beaune ready to reach Dijon where it indeed went
on the 29 th with Pellisier’s independent unit of mobilisés; the Army of the
Vosges, according to Freycinet’s orders, set about to cover the Tonnerre-
Dijon road and occupy the gorge of Val-Suzon, an essentially defensive mis-
sion, aimed at covering Bourbaki’s left flank. Bourbaki wanted to head from
the Doubs for Vesoul to defeat Werder before Zastrow’s VIIth Corps could